Income-Dependent Punitive Damages by Perry, Ronen & Kantorowicz-Reznichenko, Elena
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 95 Issue 4 
2018 
Income-Dependent Punitive Damages 
Ronen Perry 
University of Haifa 
Elena Kantorowicz-Reznichenko 
Erasmus School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Criminal Law Commons, Fourteenth Amendment 
Commons, International Law Commons, and the Torts Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Ronen Perry and Elena Kantorowicz-Reznichenko, Income-Dependent Punitive Damages, 95 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 835 (2018). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol95/iss4/6 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
835 
INCOME-DEPENDENT PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
RONEN PERRY* 
ELENA KANTOROWICZ-REZNICHENKO** 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................... 836 
I. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK ................................................................. 838 
II. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES ...................................... 843 
 A. From Compensatory to Non-Compensatory Rationales ............. 843 
B. Deterrence .................................................................................... 845 
1. Outline .................................................................................. 845 
2. Optimal Deterrence and Internalization of Harm ................ 846 
3. Absolute Deterrence and Disgorgement of Gain ................. 848 
C. Retribution ................................................................................... 850 
III. TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE DEFENDANT’S INCOME .................... 854 
A. Deterrence .................................................................................... 854 
B. Retribution .................................................................................... 857 
IV. THE PROPOSED MODEL .................................................................. 861 
A. The Criminal Law Lead ................................................................ 861 
B. Tort Law Adaptation .................................................................... 864 
V. THEORETICAL DEFENSE OF THE MODEL ......................................... 868 
A. Deterrence .................................................................................... 868 
B. Retribution .................................................................................... 871 
VI. CHALLENGES AND CONCERNS ....................................................... 874 
A. Constitutional Constraints ........................................................... 874 
B. Statutory Caps .............................................................................. 878 
C. Procedural Tools .......................................................................... 880 
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................ 882 
 
  
                                                      
* Professor of Law and Director, Aptowitzer Center for the Study of Risk, Liability, and 
Insurance, University of Haifa. 
** Lecturer and Researcher, Rotterdam Institute of Law & Economics, Erasmus School of 
Law, Erasmus University Rotterdam. 
We are grateful to Michael Faure, Louis Visscher, Ramsi Woodcock, participants in the 34th 
Annual Conference of the European Association of Law & Economics in London, and the editors of 
the Washington University Law Review for valuable comments on earlier drafts. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
836 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 95:835 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Punitive damages are sums awarded to tort victims over and above their 
compensable harm.1 Despite their relative rarity,2 they have been very 
salient in the media,3 preoccupied appellate courts,4 and fascinated 
scholars for decades.5 This prominence may be attributed, at least in part, 
to a combination of doctrinal idiosyncrasy and stupefying case outcomes. 
On the doctrinal level, punitive damages are a civil law remedy which is 
patently inconsistent with the traditional goals of civil law. From a case 
outcome perspective, the debate is fueled by “blockbuster awards,”6 such 
as a $145 billion award in a class-action brought against tobacco 
companies in Florida7 and a $28 billion award in an individual action 
                                                      
1.  See, e.g., James D. Ghiardi, Punitive Damages in Wisconsin, 60 MARQ. L. REV. 753, 760, 
766 (1977) (explaining that punitive damages are awarded “over and above” any amounts necessary 
for compensation); Robert E. Riggs, Constitutionalizing Punitive Damages: The Limits of Due 
Process, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 859, 893 (1991) (same). 
2.  All empirical studies found that punitive damages are very rarely awarded. Theodore 
Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, The Significant Association Between Punitive and Compensatory 
Damages in Blockbuster Cases: A Methodological Primer, 3 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 175, 175 
(2006) (summarizing empirical research); Catherine M. Sharkey, Economic Analysis of Punitive 
Damages: Theory, Empirics, and Doctrine, in RES. HANDBOOK ON ECON. TORTS 486, 500 (Jennifer 
Arlen ed., 2012) (same). 
3.  See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Foreign Courts Wary of U.S. Punitive Damages, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 
26, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/26/us/26punitive.html. 
4.  See, e.g., Atl Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404 (2009); Exxon Shipping Co. v. 
Baker, 554 U.S. 471 (2008); Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346 (2007); State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003); Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 
532 U.S. 424 (2001); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996); Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 
512 U.S. 415 (1994); TXO Prod. Corp. v. All Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443 (1993); Pac Mut. Life Ins. Co. 
v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 25 (1991); Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 
257 (1989); see also infra notes 7–8 and accompanying text. 
5.  See, e.g., Kenneth S. Abraham & John C. Jeffries Jr., Punitive Damages and the Rule of 
Law: The Role of Defendant’s Wealth, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 415 (1989); Robert D. Cooter, Punitive 
Damages for Deterrence: When and How Much?, 40 ALA. L. REV. 1143 (1989); Theodore Eisenberg 
& Michael Heise, Judge-Jury Difference in Punitive Damages Awards: Who Listens to the Supreme 
Court?, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 325, 327 (2011); Dorsey D. Ellis, Fairness and Efficiency in the 
Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1982); Joni Hersch & W. Kip Viscusi, Punitive 
Damages: How Judges and Juries Perform, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2004); Keith N. Hylton, A Theory of 
Wealth and Punitive Damages, 17 WIDENER L.J. 927 (2008); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 
Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 869 (1998); Michael Rustad & Thomas 
Koenig, The Historical Continuity of Punitive Damages Awards: Reforming The Tort Reformers, 42 
AM. U. L. REV. 1269 (1993); Gary T. Schwartz, Deterrence and Punishment in the Common Law of 
Punitive Damages: A Comment, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 133 (1982); Anthony J. Sebok, Punitive Damages: 
From Myth to Theory, 92 IOWA L. REV. 957 (2007); Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages as 
Societal Damages, 113 YALE L.J. 347 (2003); Cass R. Sunstein et al., Assessing Punitive Damages 
(with Notes on Cognition and Valuation in Law), 107 YALE L.J. 2071, 2081 (1998); see also supra 
notes 1–2. 
6.  See Hersch & Viscusi, supra note 5, at 4–10 (introducing the term “blockbuster awards”); 
Eisenberg & Wells, supra note 2 passim (responding to Hersch & Viscusi). 
7.  Liggett Grp. Inc. v. Engle, 853 So. 2d 434, 440–41 (Fla. 2006). The Florida Supreme 
Court observed that this was the largest punitive damages verdict in history, and concluded that it was 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol95/iss4/6
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against Philip Morris in California.8 While in both cases, as in many 
others, the extraordinary jury awards were ultimately reduced or 
overturned, they have surely left a notable mark. 
The availability of punitive damages seems undisputed in most 
common law jurisdictions, but their measure remains controversial.9 In 
particular, it is unclear whether and how courts and juries should take the 
defendant’s wealth into account in assessing punitive damages.10 This 
Article puts forward and defends an innovative yet simple method for 
incorporating this factor into the calculation. The proposal is based on an 
adaptation of a criminal law model, known as “day-fines,” which has been 
primarily used in European and Latin-American legal systems.11 A 
criminal day-fine model is based on two variables: “number of days” and 
“daily unit.”12 The former represents the gravity of the offense; measuring 
gravity in days makes the monetary sanction conceptually and 
substantively commensurate with incarceration. The latter reflects the 
offender’s financial condition. A daily unit usually constitutes a fixed 
portion of the convicted delinquent’s daily income. The two factors are 
multiplied to ascertain the total fine.  
Building on global criminal law experience, we propose a new model 
for assessing punitive damages. In brief, if the gravity of the wrong seems 
to justify an extra-compensatory award, the scope of punitive damages 
will be determined in several steps. First, the court will determine the 
gravity of the wrong and translate it into corresponding “severity units” 
(analogous to the “number of days” in the criminal law model). Next, the 
court will assess the wrongdoer’s daily income, broadly defined, or a 
particular fraction thereof. This is the “unit value” (analogous to the daily 
unit in the criminal law model). The product of these two variables 
constitutes “total damages.” Lastly, if total damages are greater than 
compensatory damages in the particular case, the punitive award should 
equal the difference between total damages and compensatory damages. If 
total damages are lower than compensatory damages, punitive damages 
should be nil. In such cases the monetary sanction that would serve the 
twin goals of punitive damages, deterrence and retribution, is lower than 
                                                                                                                           
unconstitutional and violated Florida law. Id. at 456, 470. Moreover, the court decided to decertify the 
class. Id. at 440, 470. 
8.  Bullock v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 131 Cal. Rptr. 3d 382, 391 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011). The 
plaintiff agreed to reduce the punitive award to $28 million to avoid a new trial. Id. at 391. However, 
the Court of Appeal of California granted a new trial on the matter of damages, and the punitive award 
was further reduced to $13.8 million. Id. at 392. The Court of Appeal held in 2011 that this amount 
was justified in light of the gravity of the defendant’s misconduct. Id. at 406. 
9.  See infra Part I. 
10.  See infra notes 137–138, 239–245 and accompanying text. 
11.  See infra Section IV.A. 
12.  See infra Section IV.A. 
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compensatory damages. However, as long as tort law is committed to 
rectification of harm, compensatory damages will set the lower limit of the 
monetary award. 
The Article unfolds in six parts. Part I outlines the development of the 
law governing punitive damages. Part II analyzes the possible rationales 
for this unique “middle-ground” doctrine, focusing on deterrence and 
retribution. Part III considers whether the defendant’s wealth should be 
considered in assessing punitive damages in light of their underlying 
goals. Part IV demonstrates how the defendant’s wealth can be integrated 
into the calculation. It extracts the foundations from European criminal 
justice systems and adapts the model to American civil law. Part V 
defends the proposed model from the relevant theoretical perspectives. 
Lastly, Part VI discusses potential hurdles to the implementation of the 
new model—constitutional constraints, statutory caps on punitive 
damages, and the need for special procedural tools. 
I. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
Originating in England in the mid-eighteenth century,13 punitive 
damages were soon imported into America. The first reported case was 
Genay v. Norris,14 where the court held that a person poisoned by another 
was entitled to exemplary damages.15 A few years later, in a breach of 
promise of marriage case, the court instructed the jury “not to estimate the 
damages by any particular proof of suffering or actual loss; but to give 
damages for example’s sake, to prevent such offences in future.”16 
A fierce debate over the availability and legitimacy of punitive 
damages erupted in the mid-nineteenth century between Simon Greenleaf 
and Theodore Sedgwick. On the descriptive level, Greenleaf insisted that 
damages constituted compensation for an actual harm, and should be 
“precisely commensurate with injury; neither more nor less.”17 Sedgwick 
contended that in cases of fraud, malice, gross negligence, or oppression, 
the law permitted punitive damages, thereby blending the public and 
                                                      
13.  See Wilkes v. Wood (1763) 98 Eng. Rep. 489, 498–99 (C.P.) (“[A] jury have it in their 
power to give damages for more than the injury received. Damages are designed not only as a 
satisfaction to the injured person, but likewise as a punishment . . . .”); Huckle v. Money (1763) 95 
Eng. Rep. 768, 769 (K.B.) (introducing the term “exemplary damages”). The doctrine is firmly 
entrenched in English law: Kuddus v. Chief Constable of Leicestershire Constabulary [2002] 2 AC 
122 (HL) (appeal taken from Eng.). Some argue that punitive damages may be traced back to the 
thirteenth century. Semra Mesulam, Note, Collective Rewards and Limited Punishment: Solving the 
Punitive Damages Dilemma with Class, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1114, 1121 (2004). 
14.  1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 6 (1784).  
15.  Id. at 6. 
16.  Coryell v. Colbaugh, 1 N.J.L. 77, 77 (1791). 
17.  2 SIMON GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 276 (9th ed. 1863). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol95/iss4/6
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private interests.18 Greenleaf responded that Sedgwick misinterpreted the 
case law, confusing courts’ willingness to let juries weigh intangible 
harms in assessing damages with recognition of non-compensatory 
damages.19 On the prescriptive level, Greenleaf advocated a clear 
distinction between private and public law, insisting that a plaintiff in tort 
should not be permitted to vindicate the state’s interests.20 Sedgwick 
opined that a division between the public and private interests was 
“entirely fanciful and imaginary,” and that “the sooner the idea [of 
damages as compensation] is got out of the head of a practical lawyer the 
better.”21  
The Supreme Court settled the dispute in Day v. Woodworth,22 holding 
that the jury in a tort action could inflict exemplary, punitive, or vindictive 
damages on the defendant, based on the enormity of his wrong rather than 
the measure of the plaintiff’s harm. The Court explained that despite past 
controversy, “repeated judicial decisions for more than a century are to be 
received as the best exposition of what the law is.”23 Of course, courts are 
still committed to the principle of reparation for actual harm, but most 
states allow punitive damages in exceptional cases, defined by the severity 
of the defendant’s conduct.24  
Since its recognition, the doctrine has expanded in three significant 
respects. First, by the early nineteenth century it had become clear that 
punitive damages were available not only under state common law, but 
also under Federal maritime law.25 Second, by the end of the nineteenth 
century most jurisdictions allowed punitive damages awards not only 
against individuals, but also against corporations.26 Still, there has been 
some controversy about the availability of the remedy against corporations 
                                                      
18.  THEODORE SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES 666 (3rd ed. 1858). 
19.  2 GREENLEAF, supra note 17, at 276–87 n.2; Simon Greenleaf, The Rule of Damages in 
Actions Ex Delicto, 9 L. REP. 529, 530–38 (1847). 
20.  Greenleaf, supra note 19, at 529–30. According to Greenleaf, “the state is competent to 
vindicate its own wrongs.” Id. For further discussion of Greenleaf’s position, see Rustad & Koenig, 
supra note 5, at 1299. 
21.  SEDGWICK, supra note 18, at 671–72. 
22.  54 U.S. 363, 371 (1851). 
23.  Id.; see also Denver & Rio Grande Ry. v. Harris, 122 U.S. 597, 609–10 (1887) (same); 
McWilliams v. Bragg, 3 Wis. 424, 431 (1854) (same). But cf. Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 382, 397 
(1872) (holding that punishment is “out of place, irregular, anomalous, exceptional, unjust, 
unscientific, not to say absurd and ridiculous, when classed among civil remedies” and that the idea of 
punitive damages “is a monstrous heresy. It is an unsightly and an unhealthy excrescence, deforming 
the symmetry of the body of the law”). 
24.  See Atl. Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404, 409–10 (2009) (“American courts have 
likewise permitted punitive damages awards in appropriate cases since at least 1784.”); Pac. Mut. Life 
Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 25 (1991) (“[P]unitive or ‘exemplary’ damages have long been a part of 
Anglo-American law.”). 
25.  The Amiable Nancy, 16 U.S. 546, 558 (1818). 
26.  Rustad & Koenig, supra note 5, at 1295. 
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liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior.27 The controversy also 
persists in Federal maritime law. In the Exxon Valdez case, the district 
court instructed the jury that punitive damages could be awarded against a 
principal (particularly a corporation) because of an act by an agent, inter 
alia, where the agent was employed in a managerial capacity and was 
acting in the scope of employment.28 The Ninth Circuit upheld this 
instruction.29 Exxon, the defendant, argued that courts could not award 
punitive damages under maritime law against ship owners for actions by 
underlings not “directed,” “countenanced,” or “participated in” by the 
owners.30 The Supreme Court was equally divided on this question, and 
therefore left the Ninth Circuit’s opinion undisturbed without setting a 
precedent on this matter.31 Third, while punitive damages were originally 
awarded in cases of malicious and mean-spirited conduct,32 the doctrine 
has expanded in some jurisdictions to cases of recklessness33 and even 
gross negligence.34 These three developments laid the foundations for the 
unprecedented, though ultimately reduced, punitive damages award in the 
famous Exxon Valdez case.35 
On the other hand, in the twentieth century the doctrine was somewhat 
restrained. In many states, the plaintiff was required to satisfy a higher 
standard of proof, such as “clear and convincing evidence,” to obtain 
                                                      
27.  Id. at 1295–97 (discussing this controversy); see also Ellis, supra note 5, at 63 (“[Some 
courts] follow the respondeat superior rule and hold that an employer may be liable for punitive 
damages for wrongful acts committed by employees in the course of their employment. [Others] 
follow the ‘complicity rule’ and limit vicarious punitive damage liability to those situations where 
wrongful acts were committed or specifically authorized or ratified by a managerial agent, or were 
committed by an unfit employee who was recklessly employed or retained.”); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 909 (AM. LAW INST. 1979) (providing that “recovery of punitive damages 
against a principal for the acts of an agent” is limited to certain circumstances, e.g., when the principal 
authorized or ratified the act, or when the agent was employed in a managerial capacity); In re P&E 
Boat Rentals, 872 F.2d 642, 652 (5th Cir. 1989) (endorsing the Restatement); Protectus Alpha 
Navigation Co. v. N. Pac. Grain Growers, Inc., 767 F.2d 1379, 1387 (9th Cir. 1985) (same). 
28.  Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 480 (2008). 
29.  Id. at 481. 
30.  Id. at 482–83. 
31.  Id. at 484. 
32.  Victor E. Schwartz et al., Reining in Punitive Damages “Run Wild”: Proposals for Reform 
by Courts and Legislatures, 65 BROOK. L. REV. 1003, 1007 (1999); Sharkey, supra note 2, at 487. 
33.  See Ellis, supra note 5, at 20; Rustad & Koenig, supra note 5, at 1305–07; see also 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1979) (providing that punitive damages 
may be awarded for reckless indifference to the rights of others). 
34.  See, e.g., TXO Prod. Corp. v. All. Res. Corp., 419 S.E.2d 870, 887 (W. Va. 1992) (“[T]he 
punitive damages definition of malice has grown to include not only mean-spirited conduct, but also 
extremely negligent conduct that is likely to cause serious harm.”); Rustad & Koenig, supra note 5, at 
1305–07 (discussing this development). 
35.  Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471 (2008). 
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punitive damages.36 Moreover, in most states, punitive damages were 
subject to a statutory cap—a fixed upper limit or a single-digit punitive-to-
compensatory-damages ratio.37 A few state legislatures banned punitive 
damages generally, or in certain types of cases, such as actions against the 
state or public officials, medical malpractice cases, and claims against 
drug manufacturers.38 Since the mid-1980s, a few state legislatures have 
also enacted split-recovery statutes, providing that a certain percentage of 
any punitive damages award shall be paid to the state.39 Because one of the 
primary goals of these statutes was to prevent unusual windfalls to 
                                                      
36.  See Lynda A. Sloane, Note, The Split Award Statute: A Move Toward Effectuating the 
True Purpose of Punitive Damages, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 473, 483 (1993) (discussing the standard of 
proof). 
37.  See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.020(f)–(g) (2017) (“[A]n award of punitive damages may 
not exceed the greater of (1) three times the amount of compensatory damages awarded to the plaintiff 
in the action; or (2) the sum of $500,000”; if the conduct was motivated by financial gain and the 
defendant knew the consequences, the award can reach “the greatest of (1) four times the amount of 
compensatory damages . . . ; (2) four times the aggregate amount of financial gain that the defendant 
received . . . ; or (3) the sum of $7,000,000.”); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-102(1)(a) (2017) (“The 
amount of such reasonable exemplary damages shall not exceed an amount which is equal to the 
amount of the actual damages awarded to the injured party.”); FLA. STAT. § 768.73(1) (2017) (“[A]n 
award of punitive damages may not exceed the greater of: (1) Three times the amount of compensatory 
damages . . . or (2) The sum of $500,000”; if the conduct was “motivated solely by unreasonable 
financial gain,” and the unreasonably dangerous nature of the conduct and high likelihood of injury 
were known to the defendant, the award can reach the greater of: (1) four times the amount of 
compensatory damages, or (2) $2 million.); IDAHO CODE § 6-1604(3) (2017) (“No judgment for 
punitive damages shall exceed the greater of two hundred fifty thousand dollars ($250,000) or an 
amount which is three (3) times the compensatory damages contained in such judgment.”); N.D. CENT. 
CODE § 32-03.2-11 (2017) (“[T]he amount of exemplary damages may not exceed two times the 
amount of compensatory damages or two hundred fifty thousand dollars, whichever is greater.”); see 
also infra Section VI.B. 
38.  See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-11-26 (2017) (“Punitive damages may not be awarded against the 
State or any country or municipality thereof, or any agency thereof . . . .”); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-
102(5) (2017) (“[E]xemplary damages shall not be awarded in administrative or arbitration 
proceedings . . . .”); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1115 (2017) (prohibiting punitive damages in 
legal or medical malpractice actions); 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 10/2-102 (2017) (prohibiting 
punitive damages in actions against public officials); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.80(C) (2017) 
(providing that punitive damages cannot be awarded in actions against manufacturers of drugs and 
medical devices); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.927, 31.740 (2017) (providing that punitive damages may not 
be awarded against drug manufacturers and health practitioners); W. VA. CODE § 29-12A-7 (2017) 
(prohibiting punitive damages in actions against a “political subdivision” and its employees). 
39.  See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.020(j) (2017) (transferring 50% to the state); GA. CODE 
ANN. § 51-12-5.1(e)(2) (2017) (transferring 75% to the state); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1207 
(2017) (allowing courts to apportion punitive damages among the plaintiff, his or her attorney, and the 
state); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-51-3-6 (2017) (transferring 75%); IOWA CODE ANN. § 668A.1(2) (2017) 
(transferring 75% in some cases); MO. ANN. STAT. § 537.675 (2017) (transferring 50%); UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 78B-8-201(3) (2017) (transferring 50% of any amount in excess of $50,000); see also Scott 
Dodson, Assessing the Practicality and Constitutionality of Alaska’s Split-Recovery Punitive Damages 
Statute, 49 DUKE L.J. 1335, 1337 (2000); Benjamin F. Evans, “Split-Recovery” Survives: The 
Missouri Supreme Court Upholds the State’s Power to Collect One-Half of Punitive Damage Awards, 
63 MO. L. REV. 511, 511–12 (1998). For a few years, a judge-made split-recovery rule was applied in 
Alabama. Life Ins. Co. of Ga. v. Johnson, 684 So. 2d 685, 698–99 (Ala. 1996). This rule was 
overruled in Life Ins. Co. of Ga. v. Johnson, 701 So. 2d 524, 534 (Ala. 1997) and repealed in ALA. 
CODE § 6-11-21(l) (2017). 
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plaintiffs, this trend has halted once the Supreme Court limited the 
punitive-to-compensatory damages ratio.40 
Most importantly, it was held that the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the imposition of grossly excessive or 
arbitrary penalties on a wrongdoer.41 A punitive damages award is 
therefore subject to substantive due process review. In BMW v. Gore42 the 
Supreme Court held that in reviewing awards of punitive damages under 
the Due Process Clause, courts ought to consider three guideposts. The 
first is the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s misconduct.43 
Factors relevant to this determination include the type of harm caused, 
victims’ vulnerability, defendant’s intentional malice or reckless disregard 
for health and safety of others, repetitive misconduct, and defendant’s 
efforts to mitigate the harm caused.44 The second guidepost is the disparity 
between the plaintiff’s actual or potential harm and the punitive damages 
award.45 In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell,46 
the Court held that a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory 
damages was more likely to accord with due process than awards with 
ratios in the range of 500 to 1 (or even 145 to 1, as the jury awarded in 
State Farm). However, greater ratios could be consistent with the Due 
Process Clause where “a particularly egregious act has resulted in only a 
small amount of economic damages.”47 A stricter limit is imposed under 
Federal maritime law. In the Exxon Valdez case, the Court observed that in 
recent decades the median ratio of punitive to compensatory awards had 
remained less than 1 to 1, and that the percentage of cases with punitive 
awards had not markedly increased.48 The Court concluded that awards at 
or below the empirically established median “would roughly express 
jurors’ sense of reasonable penalties in cases with no earmarks of 
exceptional blameworthiness” which do not raise special under-
enforcement problems.49 Accordingly, and given the need for 
                                                      
40.  See infra notes 45–47 and accompanying text. 
41.  State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416 (2003); Cooper Indus., Inc. 
v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 433–34 (2001); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 
U.S. 559, 562 (1996); TXO Prod. Corp. v. All. Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 453–455 (1993); see also 
infra Section VI.A. 
42.  517 U.S. at 575–85. 
43.  Id. at 575–80. 
44.  Baker v. Exxon Mobile Corp., 490 F.3d 1066, 1085–89 (9th Cir. 2007). 
45.  BMW, 517 U.S. at 580–83. 
46.  538 U.S. at 425. 
47.  Id. Perhaps TXO Prod. Corp. v. All. Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443 (1993) is such an 
exceptional case: the court allowed a $10 million punitive award even though compensatory damages 
were only $19,000, arguably because the defendant “set out on a malicious and fraudulent course.” Id. 
at 462. 
48.  Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 497–500 (2008). 
49.  Id. at 512–13. 
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predictability, the Court held that a 1 to 1 ratio was a fair upper limit in 
such maritime cases.50 Cases in which the defendant’s conduct is more 
egregious than reckless are not so limited.51 The third guidepost is the 
difference between the punitive damages award and the civil or criminal 
penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases.52 
II. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
A. From Compensatory to Non-Compensatory Rationales 
One of the most fundamental principles in the modern law of torts is 
that damages should restore the victim to the condition he or she would 
have been in but for the tort (restitutio in integrum).53 Punitive damages 
seem non-compensatory by definition. So although the doctrine’s specific 
goals are yet to be explored, it appears inconsistent with the fundamental 
remedial goal.54 A possible justification, which alleviates the conceptual 
problem, is the need to compensate for non-compensable losses such as 
hurt feelings, dignitary harm, and embarrassment.55 The Supreme Court 
observed in Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc.56 that 
until the nineteenth century “punitive damages frequently operated to 
compensate for intangible injuries, compensation which was not otherwise 
available under the narrow conception of compensatory damages prevalent 
at the time.”57 However, the historical foundations of this argument seem 
dubious,58 and at any rate, it has lost much of its appeal over time, with the 
                                                      
50.  Id. at 513. 
51.  John P. Jones, The Sky Has Not Fallen Yet on Punitive Damages in Admiralty Cases, 83 
TUL. L. REV. 1289, 1302 (2009). 
52.  BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 583–85 (1996). For a while, it was unclear 
whether these guideposts should be explained to juries, or used solely by appellate courts discussing 
the constitutionality of punitive damages awards. But in Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 
355 (2007), the court implied that juries should be advised of the proper guidelines. 
53.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 (AM. LAW INST. 1979); see also United States v. 
Hathaley, 257 F.2d 920, 923 (10th Cir. 1958) (“The fundamental principle of damages is to restore the 
injured party, as nearly as possible, to the position he would have been in had it not been for the wrong 
of the other party.”). But see John C.P. Goldberg, Two Conceptions of Tort Damages: Fair v. Full 
Compensation, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 435 (2006) (arguing that the idea of “fair compensation” predated 
the current notion of “full compensation”). 
54.  See, e.g., Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 469 n.13 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(“Tort law is tied to the goal of compensation (punitive damages being the notable exception).”). 
55.  Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 491–92 (2008) (discussing the compensatory 
rationale); David L. Walther & Thomas A. Plein, Punitive Damages: A Critical Analysis: Kink v. 
Combs, 49 MARQ. L. REV. 369, 370–71, 381 (1965) (same); Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of 
Torts, 70 HARV. L. REV. 517, 520–21 (1951) (same). 
56.  532 U.S. 424 (2001). 
57.  Id. at 437 n.11. 
58.  See Anthony J. Sebok, What Did Punitive Damages Do? Why Misunderstanding the 
History of Punitive Damages Matters Today, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 163, 164, 204–05 (2003) 
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expansion of compensatory damages for intangible harms.59 Somewhat 
related but less common was the argument that punitive damages were 
needed to compensate the victim for litigation costs, which were generally 
irrecoverable in American law.60 This argument has garnered very little 
support in the case law. Thus, punitive damages are currently deemed 
separate and distinct from compensatory damages in most jurisdictions,61 
with very few exceptions.62 
A doctrine that awards extra-compensatory damages is inconsistent 
with corrective justice theories that focus on rectification of the harm 
caused.63 What then is the purpose of punitive damages? In the past, it was 
very frequently said that the aim of these awards was “to punish and 
deter.” This phrase has been used in court decisions,64 legal literature,65 
and jury instructions.66 It is misleading because punishment is not a 
purpose but a mechanism; namely, the imposition of a sanction.67 
Imposing a sanction may have various goals, such as retribution, 
deterrence, appeasement of the victim, incapacitation of the wrongdoer, 
education, etc. Therefore, saying that punitive damages are meant to 
                                                                                                                           
(“[P]unitive damages have never served the compensatory function attributed to them by the Court in 
Cooper.”). 
59.  See Sloane, supra note 36, at 481–82 (“[T]he need for this function has waned with the 
onset of the award of damages for pain and suffering, mental distress, and most recently, hedonic 
damages.”). 
60.  See, e.g., Doroszka v. Lavine, 150 A. 692, 692–93 (Conn. 1930) (“[T]he purpose is not to 
punish the defendant . . . but to compensate the plaintiff . . . and so-called punitive or exemplary 
damages cannot exceed the amount of the plaintiff’s expenses of litigation, less taxable costs.”); James 
A. Breslo, Comment, Taking the Punitive Damage Windfall Away from the Plaintiff: An Analysis, 86 
NW. U. L. REV. 1130, 1136 (1992) (reiterating this argument); Walther & Plein, supra note 55, at 381 
(same). 
61.  Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 492 (2008). 
62.  See Markey v. Santangelo, 485 A.2d 1305, 1308 (Conn. 1985) (“Punitive damages consist 
of a reasonable expense properly incurred in the litigation.”); Peisner v. Detroit Free Press, Inc., 364 
N.W.2d 600, 608–09 (Mich. 1984) (holding that punitive damages compensate for the “incremental 
injury to feelings attributable to defendant’s malice.”). 
63.  See, e.g., ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 135 n.25 (1995) (explaining that 
punitive damages are inconsistent with the corrective goal). 
64.  See, e.g., BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996); Browning-Ferris Indus. 
of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 275 (1989); Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 
U.S. 247, 266–67 (1981); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974); Moskovitz v. Mt. 
Sinai Med. Ctr., 635 N.E.2d 331, 343 (Ohio 1994); Hodges v. S. C. Toof & Co., 833 S.W.2d 896, 900 
(Tenn. 1992); Hamilton Development Co. v. Broad Rock Club, Inc., 445 S.E.2d 140, 143 (Va. 1994). 
65.  See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1979); Howard A. 
Denemark, Seeking Greater Fairness When Awarding Multiple Plaintiffs Punitive Damages for a 
Single Act by a Defendant, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 931, 935–36 (2002); Schwartz, supra note 5, at 134; 
Walther & Plein, supra note 55, at 372–73. 
66.  See, e.g., RONALD W. EADES, JURY INSTRUCTIONS ON DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS 98 
(3rd ed. 1993) (quoting a standard jury instruction whereby the purpose of punitive damages is to 
punish and deter). 
67.  Cf. George P. Fletcher, The Place of Victims in the Theory of Retribution, 3 BUFF. CRIM. 
L. REV. 51, 52 (1999) (explaining that retributive justice means “imposing punishment because it is 
deserved on the basis of having committed a crime.”). 
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punish seems tautological. Yet the word “punishment” is often used more 
colloquially as a synonym for “retribution.” And whenever courts say that 
punitive damages are intended to “punish and deter” they seem to suggest 
that punitive damages are aimed at retribution and deterrence. This is the 
most reasonable explanation for the classical punish/deter dichotomy.68 In 
recent American decisions a more accurate terminology has been used. For 
example, in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell69 
the Supreme Court held that punitive damages “are aimed at deterrence 
and retribution.”70 Case law is unclear as to whether extra-compensatory 
damages are justified only if they serve both goals, or if either one is 
sufficient.71 
B. Deterrence 
1. Outline 
As explained above, courts have perceived deterrence as one of the two 
principal justifications for punitive damages.72 The additional sanction 
may serve to deter the specific defendant from repeating the wrong and 
others from committing similar wrongs.73 Two questions arise in this 
respect. The first is what types of wrongfulness punitive damages aim to 
deter. The simplistic answer, following Jeremy Bentham’s utilitarian 
approach, conflates the end and the means. Deterrence is such an integral 
and distinctive feature of utilitarian and economic theories of law that a 
sanction must deter inefficient conduct. But American courts seem to have 
a somewhat different intuition. For instance, in Cooper,74 the Supreme 
Court opined that the deterrent function of punitive damages was not 
exclusively efficiency-oriented: “Citizens and legislators may rightly insist 
that they are willing to tolerate some loss in economic efficiency in order 
to deter what they consider morally offensive conduct, albeit cost-
beneficial morally offensive conduct . . . .”75 
                                                      
68.  See, e.g., Ellis, supra note 5, at 1, 4 (asserting that punitive damages serve deterrence and 
retribution); David G. Owen, A Punitive Damages Overview: Functions, Problems and Reform, 39 
VILL. L. REV. 363, 373–74 (1994) (same); Sharkey, supra note 5, at 356–57 (same); Sunstein et al., 
supra note 5, at 2081 (same); Malcolm E. Wheeler, The Constitutional Case for Reforming Punitive 
Damages Procedures, 69 VA. L. REV. 269, 310 (1983) (same). 
69.  538 U.S. 408 (2003). 
70.  Id. at 416–17; see also Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 492 (2008); Pac. Mut. 
Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 19 (1991). 
71.  See Schwartz, supra note 5, at 134 (discussing this ambiguity). 
72.  Supra notes 64–66, 69–70 and accompanying text. 
73.  See Ellis, supra note 5, at 3 (discussing the deterrent effect of punitive damages). 
74.  Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424 (2001). 
75.  Id. at 439–40 (quoting Marc Galanter & David Luban, Poetic Justice: Punitive Damages 
and Legal Pluralism, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1393, 1450 (1993)). 
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The second question is why deterrence of unwarranted conduct requires 
extra-compensatory damages. As Gary Schwartz observed, those who 
point to deterrence as one of the main goals of punitive damages “are 
rendered almost useless by their obliviousness to the basic point that 
ordinary civil damages—in the course of providing compensation—
concurrently function to deter.”76 Theorists have provided two types of 
answers to this challenge: one based on internalization of harm, the other 
on disgorgement of gain.77 
2. Optimal Deterrence and Internalization of Harm 
According to classic economic theory, efficient deterrence entails 
internalization by the wrongdoer of the social harm caused by his or her 
wrongful conduct. Only if the expected liability is equivalent to (or greater 
than) the expected externalized cost, will the potential injurer internalize 
that cost and take cost-effective precautions. Compensatory damages can 
secure optimal deterrence only if: (1) wrongdoers are always liable for 
harms caused by their wrongful conduct; and (2) compensatory damages 
are set in accordance with the social cost of the wrongful conduct. Punitive 
damages may be economically justified if one of these conditions is not 
met. 
As regards the first condition, wrongdoers might escape liability for 
harms caused by their wrongful conduct.78 Several factors—external to 
substantive tort law—let many negligent injurers off scot-free. Some 
victims are unaware that their harms are the result of wrongful conduct;79 
others do not have sufficient evidence to substantiate their case;80 some 
may not sue because the expected costs of doing so outweigh the expected 
compensation,81 and many refrain from suing if there is a familial, social, 
professional, or other connection between them and the injurer.82 Thus, 
compensatory damages cannot induce potential injurers to take cost-
effective precautions. According to economic theory, punitive damages 
may be used to overcome these under-enforcement problems.83 Under this 
                                                      
76.  Schwartz, supra note 5, at 137. 
77.  See Ellis, supra note 5, at 7 (presenting the two possible answers). 
78.  See Sharkey, supra note 2, at 488 (explaining that wrongdoers might escape liability). 
79.  See Gary T. Schwartz, Empiricism and Tort Law, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1067, 1071 (2002) 
(discussing possible reasons for under-enforcement). 
80.  Id. 
81.  Id. 
82.  See Bruce Feldthusen, The Civil Action for Sexual Battery: Therapeutic Jurisprudence?, 
25 OTTAWA L. REV. 203, 213 n.31, 214 & n.34, 218 (1993) (explaining that a personal relation 
between the injurer and the victim might prevent a lawsuit). 
83.  See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT 
LAW 160–65, 184–85, 223–24 (1987) (explaining that punitive damages can help overcome under-
deterrence due to under-enforcement); STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 
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perception, total damages should be the actual harm multiplied by the 
reciprocal of the probability that the defendant will be found liable when 
he or she should be found liable; punitive damages must equal the excess 
of total damages over compensatory damages.84  
This theory has relatively weak descriptive power. An under-
enforcement rationale can hardly explain why punitive damages are 
unusual and hinge on the defendant’s state of mind.85 After all, under-
enforcement exists in most cases, including those of negligence or no-fault 
liability—not only in cases of reprehensible conduct. Moreover, the extent 
of punitive damages is determined predominantly in accordance with the 
conduct’s reprehensibility, not with the probability of escaping liability.86 
While the retributive yardstick is consistent with the constitutional 
framework (as we demonstrate below),87 the economic model might entail 
departure therefrom. Experimental studies also reveal that in assessing 
punitive damages, potential jurors rely on the reprehensibility of the 
conduct and disregard detection rates.88 These observations must be 
qualified, though, because heavier punitive awards have been deemed 
justifiable and constitutional when wrongdoing is hard to detect 
(increasing the chances of getting away with it),89 or when the value of 
injury and the corresponding compensatory award are small (providing 
low incentives to sue).90 Thus, arguably, although under-enforcement is 
not the primary factor, it is not totally ignored. The economic theory also 
raises serious practical concerns: it is extremely difficult to determine the 
actual detection rate on which the calculation is based.91 Additionally, 
administrative and criminal law may be regarded as efforts to compensate 
                                                                                                                           
148 (1987) (same); Abraham & Jeffries, supra note 5, at 419 (same); Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 
5, at 873–74 (same); Schwartz, supra note 5, at 139 (same); Sharkey, supra note 2, at 488–89 (same); 
Sharkey, supra note 5, at 365–68; Sunstein et al., supra note 5, at 2075, 2082 (same). 
84.  Cooter, supra note 5, at 1148 (discussing the multiplier method); Polinsky & Shavell, 
supra note 5, at 889, 911 (same). For further discussion of this method, see supra note 83. 
85.  See Benjamin C. Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse in the Law of Torts, 51 VAND. 
L. REV. 1, 95 (1998) (criticizing the economic theory of punitive damages); Schwartz, supra note 5, at 
141–42 (same). 
86.  But see Mathias v. Accor Economy Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672, 677 (7th Cir. 2003) 
(explaining that punitive damages serve to cancel out under-detection). 
87.  See infra Section II.C. 
88.  CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES: HOW JURIES DECIDE 135–39, 151–64 
(2002). 
89.  BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 582 (1996) (“A higher ratio may also be 
justified in cases in which the injury is hard to detect . . . .”). 
90.  Id. (“[L]ow awards of compensatory damages may properly support a higher ratio . . . if, 
for example, a particularly egregious act has resulted in only a small amount of economic damages.”); 
see also Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 494, 513 (2008) (endorsing BMW on this point). 
91.  See Sharkey, supra note 2, at 496 (discussing the inability to determine the likelihood of 
detection). 
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for private under-enforcement of law; if tort law also aims to offset under-
enforcement through punitive damages, over-deterrence may ensue.92 
As regards the second condition, compensatory damages might not 
suffice if some of the actual harm caused by wrongful conduct is legally 
non-compensable.93 Good examples are the loss of enjoyment of life in 
cases of wrongful death94 or infliction of “insults and indignities.”95 In 
such cases, punitive damages may close the gap between the externalized 
social cost and compensable private harm.96 This argument is admittedly 
problematic. From a descriptive perspective, the problem of under-
compensation, like that of under-enforcement, is also characteristic of 
cases of negligence and strict liability, where punitive damages are not 
allowed. Moreover, in many jurisdictions punitive damages are precluded 
in cases of death, where they should be readily available according to the 
theoretical argument.97 From a prescriptive perspective, if existing law 
fails to compensate for significant elements of harm, the proper strategy 
entails reforming or revising the law directly, “rather than straining for a 
surrogate result through reliance on punitive damages.”98 
3. Absolute Deterrence and Disgorgement of Gain 
According to an alternative economic theory, compensatory damages 
might not provide the appropriate incentive when the wrongdoer derives 
illicit gains, financial or non-financial, from the wrongful conduct. In the 
leading English case of Rookes v. Barnard,99 Lord Devlin opined that if a 
person expects personal profit from wrongdoing to exceed compensable 
harm to others, compensation is an insufficient deterrent: “Exemplary 
damages can properly be awarded whenever it is necessary to teach a 
wrongdoer that tort does not pay.”100 More recently, the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court held in Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc.,101 that punitive 
damages, by removing the profit from illegal activity, can help deter such 
                                                      
92.  See Sunstein et al., supra note 5, at 2084. 
93.  See, e.g., Ellis supra note 5, at 28 (contending that these non-compensable losses include 
relational economic and emotional harms). 
94.  See Sharkey, supra note 2, at 491 (discussing wrongful death). 
95.  See Schwartz, supra note 5, at 139 (discussing “insults and indignities”). 
96.  See Mark A. Geistfeld, Punitive Damages, Retribution, and Due Process, 81 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 263 (2008) (considering wrongful death). 
97.  Schwartz, supra note 5, at 142–43. 
98.  Id. at 139–40; see also Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 5, at 939–41 (making this argument 
with respect to loss of enjoyment of life in wrongful death cases). 
99.  [1964] AC 1129 (HL) (appeal taken from Eng.). 
100.  Id. at 1227; see also Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby, 539 So. 2d 218, 223 (Ala. 1989) (“If the 
wrongful conduct was profitable to the defendant, the punitive damages should remove the profit and 
should be in excess of the profit, so that the defendant recognizes a loss.”). 
101.  563 N.W.2d 154, 165 (Wis. 1997). 
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conduct; “the defendant recognizes a loss” only when punitive damages 
exceed the profit created by the misconduct. This argument has found 
support in the law and economics literature.102  
From an economic perspective, eliminating the wrongdoer’s gains may 
be warranted in two types of cases. First, when the activity is undesirable 
and must be avoided altogether.103 According to Polinsky & Shavell, this 
can happen when the injurer’s gain is socially illicit, and therefore should 
not be taken into account in the social welfare calculation.104 To the extent 
that the legitimate gain (which might be nil) is lower than the harm, the act 
should be deterred completely. Yet compensatory damages will not 
provide the necessary deterrence if the injurer’s total gain exceeds the 
compensable harm. Complete deterrence requires disgorgement of the 
gain.105 For example, if A’s activity generates a $5,000 gain for A and a 
$1,000 loss to B, but A’s activity is undesirable (the gain is socially illicit), 
compensatory damages will not prevent A from committing the wrongful 
conduct. Gains from harmful conduct may be socially illicit “when the 
injurer’s utility derives from causing harm itself, as when a person 
punches another out of spite or defames another to see him suffer.”106 An 
activity may also be undesirable when the injurer’s gain is greater than 
compensable harm, but the conduct has additional negative implications 
not addressed by tort law. Here too, complete deterrence is required, and 
may be achieved through disgorgement of gain. 
Second, when transaction costs between the potential injurer and the 
potential victim are low, a negotiated ex ante agreement with respect to the 
interest at risk is more efficient than ex post tort litigation. The 
administrative costs of an agreement are lower than those of litigation, and 
an agreement better reflects subjective valuations than a court ruling. A 
compensatory damages model induces the potential injurer to unilaterally 
cause harm when the net personal gain exceeds that harm, although a 
negotiated agreement is preferable. Punitive damages based on the 
injurer’s gain induce the potential injurer to seek voluntary transfer of 
entitlement, thereby giving effect to property rights.107 
                                                      
102.  See, e.g., Robert D. Cooter, Economic Analysis of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 
79, 98 (1982) (“[P]unitive damages should be computed at a level that offsets the illicit pleasure of 
noncompliance or the exceptional costs of compliance that motivated the injurer.”); Hylton, supra note 
5 passim.  
103.  Hylton, supra note 5, at 933–34; Sharkey, supra note 2, at 489, 492. 
104.  Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 5, at 909. 
105.  Id. 
106.  Id. Note, however, that one might challenge the exclusion of “illicit gains” from aggregate 
welfare calculations. See, e.g., Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. 
POL. ECON. 169, 173 (1968) (assigning social value to offenders’ gains). 
107.  Sharkey, supra note 2, at 493. Such incentives are known as “kickers” in criminal law and 
economics literature. Jules L. Coleman, Crime, Kickers, and Transaction Structures, in 27 CRIMINAL 
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Like harm-internalization theories, the gain elimination-model also has 
little support in the case law. The defendant’s financial or non-financial 
gain is not correlated with reprehensibility. Additionally, it can neither 
explain nor justify the single-digit ratio guideline, which does not seem to 
have deterrence-oriented or retributive explanations at all.108 Still, the 
Supreme Court in Haslip109 considered “the profitability to the defendant 
of the wrongful conduct and the desirability of removing that profit and of 
having the defendant also sustain a loss” relevant in determining whether a 
punitive damages award was excessive. Note further that illicit gains are 
often handled through criminal law; in such cases, punitive damages may 
be justified only if for some reason the criminal system malfunctions.110 
C. Retribution 
Retribution may be defined as imposing a sanction that corresponds to 
individual moral desert.111 The wrongdoer deserves to be punished on 
account of her wrongful conduct, and ought to be punished fairly 
regardless of the consequences of her punishment.112 Thus, the concept of 
retribution entails two components: wrongfulness and just desert. The 
content of the wrong, for which a punishment is deserved, is not 
consensual, nor does it have to be. Retribution is a form of justice, not an 
independent substantive moral standard: It determines how justice should 
be done whenever a wrong is committed. The definition of wrongfulness 
is left to legal philosophers. 
Retributive justice does not require that the sanction be identical to the 
wrong, unlike the primeval lex talionis.113 Rather, it insists on 
proportionality between the severity of the sanction and the gravity of the 
wrong.114 The sanction must meet the complementary tests of cardinal 
                                                                                                                           
JUSTICE: NOMOS 313, 318–19 (J. Ronald Pennock & John W. Chapman, eds., 1985) (discussing this 
literature). 
108.  Sharkey, supra note 2, at 495. 
109.  Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 21–22 (1991). 
110.  Schwartz, supra note 5, at 138–39. 
111.  See Fletcher, supra note 67, at 52 (“[Retributive justice means] imposing punishment 
because it is deserved on the basis of having committed a crime.”). 
112.  Id. Retributive justice is therefore retrospective, in that it looks backward to the particular 
wrongdoing, not forward to the consequences of the sanction. 
113.  “The law of retaliation, which requires the infliction upon a wrongdoer of the same injury 
which he has caused to another.” Lex talionis, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990). 
114.  See, e.g., TONY HONORÉ, RESPONSIBILITY AND FAULT 13, 83–84, 92, 123, 138 (1999) 
(explaining that retribution requires proportionality between the severity of the sanction and the 
gravity of the misconduct); Peter Cane, Retribution, Proportionality, and Moral Luck in Tort Law, in 
THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS 141, 143, 160–61 (Peter Cane & Jane Stapleton eds., 1998) (same); Tony 
Honoré, The Morality of Tort Law – Questions and Answers, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
TORT LAW 73, 87 (David G. Owen ed., 1995) (same); Jean Hampton, Correcting Harms Versus 
Righting Wrongs: The Goal of Retribution, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1659, 1690 (1992) (same); Jeffrie G. 
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(absolute) and ordinal (relative) proportionality.115 According to the 
former, the sanction should not be too harsh or too lenient with respect to 
the absolute gravity of the wrong committed.116 For example, it is unfair to 
impose a life sentence on a person who evaded a parking charge; similarly, 
it is unfair to impose a small fine on a cold-blooded murderer. According 
to the principle of ordinal proportionality, the sanction imposed for a 
certain wrong must reflect the relative gravity of the wrong: if wrong A is 
graver than wrong B, the sanction for wrong A must be more severe than 
the sanction for wrong B, and vice versa.117 For example, the punishment 
for murder must always be more severe than the punishment for non-
payment for parking. The principle of cardinal proportionality sets the 
upper and lower limits of the possible sanction in a given society 
regardless of the wrong’s relative gravity. The principle of ordinal 
proportionality narrows these boundaries, so that the order of harshness of 
actual sanctions will correspond to the order of gravity of the given 
wrongs.118 
The principle of proportionality is usually justified in terms of 
fairness.119 However, as Cesare Beccaria and Jeremy Bentham noted, 
proportionality can also be defended in terms of marginal deterrence.120 
Put differently, even if the justice system is incapable of deterring all 
wrongs, it should aspire at least to prevent the wrongdoer from committing 
greater wrongs. Consider, for instance, an intoxicated driver who hits and 
injures a pedestrian. If the sanction is independent of the driver’s response 
to the accident, he might be incentivized to escape from the scene to avoid 
liability. Escaping makes the offense graver, because it deprives the victim 
of potential help which can reduce the risk to life and limb. Imposing a 
more severe sanction for a “hit and run” offense will achieve marginal 
deterrence: even though a person is willing to drive intoxicated despite the 
risk of liability for injuring another, he or she may not be willing to pay 
the additional price of escaping. Similarly, consider a case of fraud. If the 
                                                                                                                           
Murphy, Does Kant Have a Theory of Punishment?, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 509, 530–32 (1987) (same); 
Note, Punitive Damages and Libel Law, 98 HARV. L. REV. 847, 851 (1985) (same). 
115.  See ANDREW VON HIRSCH, CENSURE AND SANCTIONS 29–46 (1993); ANDREW VON 
HIRSCH, PAST OR FUTURE CRIMES: DESERVEDNESS AND DANGEROUSNESS IN THE SENTENCING OF 
CRIMINALS 40–46 (1985); Cane, supra note 114, at 143, 161; Ellis, supra note 5, at 6–7. 
116.  See Cane, supra note 114, at 143. 
117.  See id. 
118.  See Ronen Perry, The Role of Retributive Justice in the Common Law of Torts: A 
Descriptive Theory, 73 TENN. L. REV. 177, 182–83 (2006) (discussing the distinction between cardinal 
and ordinal proportionality). 
119.  See Schwartz, supra note 5, at 134 (explaining that the goal of “punishment” is founded on 
conceptions of fairness). 
120.  CESARE BECCARIA, AN ESSAY ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 28–32 (Edward D. 
Ingraham trans., 1819) (1764); 2 JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF 
MORALS AND LEGISLATION 14–15, 20 (2nd ed. 1823). 
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sanction for fraud is constant, the offender is incentivized to commit a 
fraud of a greater scale, with more victims and greater gains. 
Wherever recognized, punitive damages are reserved for exceptional 
cases. Awarding non-compensatory damages is inconsistent with the 
corrective structure of tort law. Therefore, punitive damages are awarded 
merely on the margins, where courts feel that a compensatory award is an 
extremely lenient sanction with regard to the gravity of the defendant’s 
conduct.121 In other cases, the discrepancy between the gravity of the 
wrong and the severity of the sanction is left untouched for the sake of 
corrective justice. As observed by the Supreme Court, it should be 
presumed that a plaintiff has been made whole for his or her injuries by 
compensatory damages; punitive damages should only be awarded if the 
defendant’s culpability, after having paid compensatory damages, is so 
reprehensible as to warrant the imposition of further sanctions to achieve 
retribution or deterrence.122 
Of deterrence and retribution, the latter seems the dominant goal. It was 
held that an award of punitive damages must reflect the gravity of the 
respective wrong,123 and that punitive damages are subject to the Due 
Process Clause, which prohibits the imposition of grossly excessive or 
arbitrary penalties.124 Substantive due process review follows the BMW v. 
Gore guideposts.125 The first guidepost—degree of reprehensibility, which 
is also the most important one,126 can be easily explained in retributive 
terms. Determining the severity of the sanction in light of the degree of 
reprehensibility—absolute and relative—is essentially an exercise of 
retributive justice.127 The third guidepost (relation to civil penalties in 
comparable cases) seems to aim at ordinal proportionality: similar wrongs 
deserve similar sanctions. The second guidepost (ratio of punitive 
damages to actual harm) may also be linked to the notion of retributive 
justice. Although it is separate from the first, the potential harm is in fact 
one of the primary indicators of the gravity of the defendant’s conduct. 
However, the second guidepost is apparently intended to prevent the 
                                                      
121.  See, e.g., David Luban, A Flawed Case Against Punitive Damages, 87 GEO. L.J. 359, 364 
(1998). 
122.  State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 419 (2003); BMW of N. Am., 
Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996). 
123.  See, e.g., Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. 363, 371 (1851). 
124.  See supra note 41; infra Section VI.A. 
125.  See supra notes 42–52 and accompanying text. 
126.  BMW, 517 U.S. at 575 (“[T]he most important indicium of the reasonableness of a punitive 
damages award is the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct.”); Jacque v. Steenberg 
Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154, 164 (Wis. 1997) (quoting BMW). 
127.  Sharkey, supra note 2, at 495; see also Schwartz, supra note 5, at 144 (observing that the 
“punitive” nature explains “why the precise ‘degree of reprehensibility’ in the defendant’s conduct is a 
key element in calculating the quantum of punitive damages”). 
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plaintiff from acquiring an unreasonable windfall, and possibly to generate 
some certainty with respect to the extent of damages, not to ensure that the 
defendant’s sanction is proportional. In any event, the first—retributive—
guidepost is the dominant one.128 
The dominance of the retributive justification is apparent not only in 
judicial rhetoric, but also in jury perceptions of the goals of punitive 
damages. Empirical evidence suggests that juries do not attempt to 
promote optimal deterrence but to “punish” wrongdoing, with at most a 
signal designed to ensure that certain misconduct will not happen again.129 
Ordinary people do not spontaneously think in terms of optimal deterrence 
when asked about appropriate punishment, and it is very hard to oblige 
them to think in these terms.130 People assume the role of jurors with 
retributive intuitions, and it remains unclear whether and to what extent 
the courtroom can overcome them.131 
Two comments are necessary at this point. First, egregious conduct 
may give rise to various types of sanctions, legal (criminal, administrative, 
civil, or disciplinary) and extra-legal (such as reputational harm). To avoid 
disproportion between the overall burden imposed on the defendant and 
the gravity of her wrong, these sanctions must be taken into account in 
deciding whether punitive damages may be awarded in a specific case, and 
in determining their amount.132 Some jurisdictions have barred punitive 
damages in a civil action following or pending criminal conviction for the 
same conduct.133 However, the prevailing view in the US is that criminal 
conviction does not bar punitive damages, although it should be taken into 
account in determining the size of the award.134 
Second, an interesting question concerns judicial readiness to award 
punitive damages against firms. Firms are not persons, and when punitive 
damages are imposed on them, those who suffer may not be wrongdoers at 
                                                      
128.  Experimental studies demonstrate that jurors are motivated primarily by a sense of moral 
outrage at reprehensible conduct. SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 88, at 236–38. 
129.  Sunstein et al., supra note 5, at 2085. 
130.  Id. at 2111. 
131.  Id. 
132.  See Schwartz, supra note 5, at 145 (“[A] punitive damage penal theory must explain why 
the criminal law does not adequately fulfill society’s punishment objectives.”). 
133.  See Walther & Plein, supra note 55, at 384; see also Perm. Civ. App. 9670/07 Jane Doe v. 
John Doe (unpublished, 2009) (Isr.) (holding that if the wrongdoer has already been sentenced for the 
same misconduct in a criminal process, punitive damages will be utterly exceptional). 
134.  See, e.g., Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 22 (1991) (holding that the 
imposition of criminal sanctions on the defendant for its conduct should be considered in assessing the 
reasonableness of a punitive damages award); In re Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d 1215, 1226 (9th Cir. 
2001) (“[A] prior criminal sanction does not . . . bar punitive damages.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 908 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1979) (“The awarding of punitive damages is not prevented by a 
prior criminal conviction for the same act, which is relevant only to the amount of the award . . . .”); 
Annotation, Assault: Criminal Liability as Barring or Mitigating Recovery of Punitive Damages, 98 
A.L.R.3d 870 (1980). 
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all.135 A punitive damages award may end up injuring not the firm so 
much as stockholders (if the firm absorbs the cost or a fraction of it, and 
profits consequently plummet), consumers (if the firm spreads the cost ex 
post through price increases), and employees (if the firm is forced to cut 
back, or goes into liquidation), who had nothing to do with the underlying 
wrong. It is far from clear that juries awarding punitive damages are aware 
of this point or can be easily convinced of its validity.136 At any rate, this 
article focuses on individual defendants, so any concerns arising from the 
imposition of monetary sanctions on corporate defendants should be 
reserved for future research. 
III. TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE DEFENDANT’S INCOME 
Many state courts and legislatures have recognized the relevance of the 
defendant’s wealth in determining the extent of punitive damages,137 and 
this is often reflected in applicable jury instructions.138 This Part 
demonstrates that taking the defendant’s wealth into account may be 
consistent with the twin goals of punitive damages.  
A. Deterrence 
Intuitively, the deterrent effect of a monetary sanction depends on the 
offender’s wealth: “A six-figure punitive judgment against a multi-
billionaire would have the same deterrent impact as a parking ticket to the 
average person.”139 However, the classic economic argument is that the 
                                                      
135.  See Schwartz, supra note 5, at 144 (“[T]he entire notion of punishment-as-punishment 
becomes deeply problematic when applied to the corporate form.”). 
136.  Sunstein et al., supra note 5, at 2114 n.157. 
137.  See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 768.72(1) (2017); IOWA CODE § 668A.1 (2017); KAN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 60-3701(b)(6) (2017); MINN. STAT. § 549.20(3) (2017); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-65(1)(f)(ii)(3) 
(2017); MO. ANN. STAT. § 510.263(2) (2017); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42.005(4) (2017); OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. § 2307.80(B)(6) (2017); Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby, 539 So. 2d 218, 222 (Ala. 1989) (“The 
defendant’s financial position is . . . a consideration essential to a post-judgment critique of a punitive 
damages award.”); Neal v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 582 P.2d 980, 990 (Cal. 1978) (“Also to be considered 
is the wealth of the particular defendant; obviously, the function of deterrence . . . will not be served if 
the wealth of the defendant allows him to absorb the award with little or no discomfort.”); Liggett 
Group Inc. v. Engle, 853 So. 2d 434, 458 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (“A defendant’s financial capacity 
is a crucial factor in determining the appropriateness of a punitive damages award.”), quashed in 
irrelevant part, 945 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. 2006); Tetuan v. A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 738 P.2d 1210, 1242 
(Kan. 1987) (holding that the punitive award was not excessive in light of the defendant’s sales and 
earnings); Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 684 P.2d 187, 216, 221 (Colo. 1984) (holding that the 
punitive award was not excessive in light of the “financial ability of the offender to pay”). 
138.  ARK. MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS—CIVIL § 2218 (2016) (“In arriving at the amount of 
punitive damages you may consider the financial condition of (defendant), as shown by the 
evidence.”); CAL. CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 3947, 3949 (2017) (requiring consideration of the 
defendant’s financial condition in determining the amount necessary to punish and deter); WIS. JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS: CIVIL § 1707.1 (2017) (same). 
139.  Hylton, supra note 5, 927, 928. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol95/iss4/6
 
 
 
 
 
 
2018] INCOME-DEPENDENT PUNITIVE DAMAGES 855 
 
 
 
defendant’s wealth is irrelevant for deterring socially undesirable 
conduct.140 Recall that punitive damages may serve two economic 
purposes.141 First, they may secure internalization of the social costs of 
wrongful conduct, thereby affecting potential injurers’ levels of precaution 
without eradicating socially beneficial activities. For example, if the 
injurer causes the victim a $100 loss, but the probability of finding the 
injurer liable is 0.25, total damages in the amount of $100/0.25=$400 
(compensatory damages of $100, and punitive damages of $300) will 
secure internalization. Second, punitive damages may eliminate 
defendants’ gains from wrongful conduct, thereby eradicating socially 
undesirable activities. For example, if the injurer imposes a loss of $100 
on the victim and gains $500 from the conduct, but the activity is 
undesirable, the court should impose a compensatory award of $100 and a 
punitive award of at least $400 to eliminate the gain and eradicate the 
activity. 
If the purpose of punitive damages is to internalize the social costs of 
wrongful conduct, the defendant’s wealth seems irrelevant in the 
determination of a punitive judgment. The compensatory and punitive 
components of damages, which together internalize the full social costs of 
the defendant’s conduct, are both independent of the defendant’s wealth.142 
And whether the defendant is wealthy or poor, his or her personal cost-
benefit analysis (expected liability versus the cost of avoiding it) is the 
same. Thus, the defendant’s wealth seems irrelevant to efficient 
deterrence. The multi-billionaire and the pauper must pay the same 
punitive judgment.143 Similarly, if the defendant is driven by a desire to 
obtain a certain profit or to avoid a certain cost, the punitive judgment can 
be set at a level that prevents him or her from obtaining that profit or 
avoiding that cost. As long as the profit or cost can be defined 
independently of the defendant’s wealth, there should be no need to 
consider or even know the defendant’s wealth in determining the proper 
punitive award.144 
However, a more sophisticated analysis demonstrates that in some 
circumstances wealth may be relevant.145 To begin with, the wrongdoer’s 
wealth should be taken into account when “either the victim’s loss or the 
defendant’s gain from wrongdoing is unobservable and correlated with the 
                                                      
140.  Abraham & Jeffries, supra note 5, at 415; Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 5, at 913. 
141.  See also Hylton, supra note 5, at 932–934 (discussing the two economic justifications). 
142.  Cooter, supra note 5, at 1176–77; Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 5, at 913. 
143.  Abraham & Jeffries, supra note 5, 417 and passim; Brief for Mitchell Polinsky et al. as 
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346 (2011) (No.05-
1256), 2007 U.S. LEXIS 1332. 
144.  Hylton, supra note 5, at 929. 
145.  Id. at 930. 
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defendant’s wealth.”146 In such cases, the defendant’s wealth serves as a 
proxy for a particular variable which is relevant in the assessment of 
punitive damages. 
If we use punitive damages to secure full internalization of the social 
costs of wrongful conduct, information on the defendant’s wealth may be 
relevant when the external costs are not observable and wealth can be used 
as a proxy or help estimate external costs. But since in most cases the 
external costs are directly observable, information on the defendant’s 
wealth will not be necessary to ensure full internalization.147  
If we use punitive damages to disgorge gains and eradicate undesirable 
activity, information on the defendant’s wealth may be relevant when the 
gain is not observable and is correlated with the defendant’s wealth.148 The 
wrongful gain is unobservable if it cannot be evaluated by an exogenously 
determined price, and it is correlated with wealth to the extent that the 
willingness to pay for obtaining it increases with wealth. Specifically, 
when a person spitefully causes harm to another or intentionally 
appropriates the other’s unique property for the injurer’s own enjoyment, 
the gain is equal to the maximum the injurer would be willing to pay to 
impose the same loss on the victim. In such cases, no objective signals of 
the injurer’s gain are available. However, it is highly plausible that the 
injurer’s gain (willingness to pay) is correlated with his or her wealth, 
because the value of money tends to decline as wealth increases.149 Put 
differently, in cases of spiteful pleasure or intentional appropriation the 
gain is unobservable and correlated with wealth, so punitive damages 
should be correlated with the defendant’s wealth.150 For example, to offset 
the utility a rich person would obtain from slandering someone he or she 
disliked, we might need to impose $10,000 in punitive damages, whereas 
to deter a person with only modest assets, $1,000 in punitive damages 
might suffice.151 In sum, because the victim’s loss is typically observable, 
wealth will tend to be a relevant factor only when the legal system aims to 
eliminate the defendant’s gain and eradicate the wrongful activity. 
In addition to the case in which the defendant’s illicit gain is 
unobservable and correlated with his or her wealth, the wrongdoer’s 
wealth may also be relevant in assessing punitive damages if (1) potential 
injurers are risk-averse, and (2) they do not have access to liability 
insurance covering punitive damages. In such cases, appropriate 
                                                      
146.  Id. at 930, 937. 
147.  Id. at 936. 
148.  Id. at 936–38. 
149.  Id. at 938–42; Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 5, at 914. 
150.  See also Abraham & Jeffries, supra note 5, at 418 (explaining that wealth may be relevant 
in setting punitive damages awards to deter those who cause harm out of spite or malice). 
151.  Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 5, at 914. 
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deterrence will be accomplished with a lower level of damages than if 
potential injurers are risk-neutral. The more risk-averse an individual is, 
the lower the optimal level of damages. Assuming that less wealthy 
individuals are more risk-averse than the wealthier ones, the optimal level 
of punitive damages will be lower for poorer individuals. Thus, punitive 
damages should be higher for wealthier individuals. However, if the 
purpose of punitive damages is to secure internalization of harm, then 
even the wealthiest individuals should not be obliged to pay punitive 
damages exceeding the level determined by the multiplier formula.152 
Note that from an economic perspective, wealth should play no role in 
the determination of a punitive judgment against corporations. The reason 
is that a corporation will be rationally motivated by the incremental 
monetary benefits and costs of its actions, and those benefits and costs are 
independent of the corporation’s wealth.153 Corporations do not act out of 
noneconomic motivations which sometimes direct the conduct of 
individuals, such as a desire to experience a spiteful pleasure,154 and they 
are generally risk-neutral. If damages payable by a corporation exceed the 
harm multiplied by the reciprocal of the probability of enforcement, the 
corporation will be led to take excessive precautions.155 Moreover, 
imposing punitive damages that depend on wealth imposes a tax on 
corporate size and success, discouraging growth and development, 
especially in industries involving high liability costs (such as the 
pharmaceutical and aircraft industries).156 
B. Retribution 
In recent years, several scholars have opined that retributive justice 
must take into account the subjective experience of punishment.157 The 
idea is that wrongdoers may experience sanctions differently, and that 
their punishment should reflect these experiential differences to achieve 
proportionality between the gravity of the wrong and the severity of the 
sanction.158 If wrongdoers suffer more or less than deserved because of 
                                                      
152.  Id. at 913. 
153.  Hylton, supra note 5, at 944–45; Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 5, at 910–14. 
154.  Abraham & Jeffries, supra note 5, at 418–19; Hylton, supra note 5, at 945; Polinsky & 
Shavell, supra note 5, at 914. Corporate officials might of course act out of noneconomic motivations. 
In such cases, individually assessed punitive damage may be due. Presumably, these officials can 
expect even more severe sanctions in the realm of employment. 
155.  Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 5, at 911. This is apparently true only for strict liability. 
156.  Id. at 911–12. 
157.  Dan Markel & Chad Flanders, Bentham on Stilts: The Bare Relevance of Subjectivity to 
Retributive Justice, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 907, 915–16 (2010). 
158.  See generally, Adam J. Kolber, The Subjective Experience of Punishment, 109 COLUM. L. 
REV. 182 passim (2009). Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and Mazur adopt the same normative assumption but 
focus on the impact of “hedonic adaptation” on the experienced severity of the punishment, and 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
858 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 95:835 
 
 
 
their experience and preferences, the differences between the deserved 
sanctions and the perceived sanctions are unjust from a retributive 
perspective.159 Strict retributive subjectivism, advocated by Adam Kolber, 
requires calibration of punishment to each wrongdoer’s idiosyncratic 
psychological profile—experiences, capacities, and baselines.160 This 
version has been contested in legal literature.161 Yet there is little 
disagreement with the view that from a retributive perspective, 
“punishment ranges or modes should draw on generalizations informed by 
human psychology.”162  
Strict subjectivists and more traditional retributivists seem to agree that 
if monetary sanctions aim at retributive justice, they cannot be 
independent of wrongdoers’ wealth.163 The community aims to make the 
wrongdoer suffer in a manner proportional to the wrong done. To this end, 
we need to estimate the effect of sanctions on well-being, and to assess the 
impact of monetary sanctions, we need to know how wealthy wrongdoers 
are.164 The Supreme Court correctly observed in BMW that “a fixed dollar 
award will punish a poor person more than a wealthy one.”165 This 
understanding hinges on the principle of the diminishing marginal utility 
of individual wealth, depicted in Figure 1. The intuitive explanation for 
this principle is that any addition to a person’s wealth is used to satisfy 
less important and less urgent needs.166 
                                                                                                                           
conclude that such adaptation mitigates the differences between more and less severe sentences. John 
Bronsteen et al., Happiness and Punishment, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1037, 1070–71 (2009) [hereinafter 
Bronsteen et al., Happiness and Punishment]; see also Bronsteen et al., Retribution and the Experience 
of Punishment, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1463, 1469 (2010) [hereinafter Bronsteen et al., Retribution] (“[T]he 
decisions about which punishments to impose and the decisions associated with proportionality must 
depend on knowledge about how those punishments are typically experienced by offenders.”). 
159.  Bronsteen et al., Happiness and Punishment, supra note 158, at 1039, 1069–72; Kolber, 
supra note 158, at 188, 216, 236. 
160.  Kolber, supra note 158, at 185–87, 216, 236. 
161.  See, e.g., Markel & Flanders, supra note 157 passim (challenging the subjective accounts 
of retribution); Kenneth W. Simons, Retributivists Need Not and Should Not Endorse the Subjectivist 
Account of Punishment, 109 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 1 passim (2009) (same). 
162.  Markel & Flanders, supra note 157, at 956; see also Bronsteen et al., Retribution, supra 
note 158, at 1464 (“[T]o the extent that [a certain psychological phenomenon] affects the experience of 
punishment that the typical person is expected to have, [it] is relevant to punishment.”). 
163.  See, e.g., Bronsteen et al., Retribution, supra note 158, at 1475 (“The reason that 
noncontingent fines communicate insufficient condemnation is that they are typically experienced as 
insufficiently negative when they are very small relative to the offender’s wealth.”); Kolber, supra 
note 158, at 226 (making a similar argument); Markel & Flanders, supra note 157, at 956–57 (same); 
Simons, supra note 161, at 6 n.11 (“Kolber aptly criticizes, as crude and unjustifiable, the widespread 
current practice of imposing an invariant, one-size-fits-all criminal fine for a particular crime, without 
regard to the offender’s wealth or income.”). For Jeremy Bentham’s view on this matter, see infra note 
180. 
164.  Perry, supra note 118, at 188 n.57. 
165.  BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 591 (1996). 
166.  SHAVELL, supra note 83, at 186. 
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Figure 1. Utility Function 
 
The private utility function does not have an accurate mathematical 
formulation. Steven Shavell chose to demonstrate the diminishing 
marginal utility of wealth with a negative exponential function of this 
form: y=a(1-e(-x/b)) (x representing wealth and y representing utility).167 
But in our view this choice is somewhat problematic because it assumes 
an upper limit to the private utility of wealth (the asymptote y=a in the 
positive region). An increasing concave function with no horizontal 
asymptotes, such as y=a´log(x/b+1), would give a more accurate 
description of the phenomenon.168 Persons whose private utility functions 
are concave are risk-averse, although characterizing a person by his or her 
attitude to risk is less relevant in ex post application of retributive justice, 
when the wrongdoer has to bear a certain burden and not a probabilistic 
risk. 
                                                      
167.  Id. at 188–89. 
168.  A logarithmic function y=a´log(x/b+1) displays four important properties. First, no wealth 
generates no utility. In mathematical terms, the function passes through the origin. Second, more 
wealth always generates more utility. In mathematical terms, the function is increasing. Third, each 
additional $1 has a lower perceived value. This is the diminishing marginal utility of wealth. In 
mathematical terms the function is concave in the positive region. Fourth, although marginal utility 
decreases, the utility that people can derive from wealth is unbounded. In mathematical terms the 
function has no maxima or asymptote. The negative exponential function y=a(1-e(-x/b)) has the first 
three properties but lacks the fourth. For a discussion of this feature see, e.g., Peter C. Fishburn, 
Unbounded Utility Functions in Expected Utility Theory, 90 Q. J. ECON. 163 (1976). In addition to its 
formal appropriateness, the logarithmic function is simple to understand and easy to use in numerical 
examples. 
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Now assume Moe, Larry, and Curly, have a similar utility function, 
y=10,000log(x/10,000+1). Moe has $10,000,000, Larry $1,000,000, and 
Curly $100,000. Each commits the same intentional wrong. Imposing a 
monetary sanction of $100,000 for this wrong will result in a loss of 
10,414 utility units for Curly (the value of his entire wealth), 452 utility 
units for Larry, and only 44 for Moe.169 If punishment is designed to inflict 
a certain loss of utility on the actor, a wealthy wrongdoer should be 
required to bear a larger monetary sanction than an indigent wrongdoer.170 
To the extent that punitive damages serve a retributive goal, it makes sense 
to consider the defendant’s wealth in calculating the punitive award.171 
To be sure, the shape of individual utility functions (the values of a and 
b in the logarithmic formulation) varies. Clearly, liability for $10,000 
harms a person more than liability for $1,000, but whether liability for 
$10,000 harms Jack more than it harms Jill cannot be ascertained based on 
their relative wealth. The wealthier defendants may value their money 
more than the less wealthy; hence the assumption that larger penalties are 
always needed to inflict the same impact on wealthier defendants is 
somewhat speculative.172 However, the fact that individual utility 
functions vary does not undermine the understanding that marginal utility 
normally decreases, and that the utility function is concave for most 
people. Generally, therefore, the wrongdoer’s wealth is expected to have a 
real impact on the experienced severity of the monetary sanction.  
The remaining question is how relative wealth should be reflected in 
the severity of the punishment. Strict subjectivists might require 
consideration of individual utility curves. But this is impractical and 
theoretically unsound.173 More traditional retributivists will probably 
endorse an ex ante, objective, rule-based determination of monetary 
sanctions,174 integrating the need for proportionate punishment with the 
understanding that the experienced severity of these sanctions hinges on 
the wrongdoer’s wealth. This method is practical, and while the outcome 
might be imprecise, it will be fair—in the sense of roughly treating the 
equals equally, and the unequals unequally, and also in the sense of 
certainty and predictability of punishments. 
 
                                                      
169.  Utility losses are calculated as follows (x being the wrongdoer’s initial wealth): 
10,000log(x/10,000+1)−10,000log((x−100,000)/10,000+1). 
170.  Hylton, supra note 5, at 928 n.2. 
171.  Schwartz, supra note 5, at 144. 
172.  Abraham & Jeffries, supra note 5, at 421. 
173.  As explained above, strict subjectivism is rejected by most theorists. See supra Section 
III.B. 
174.  Markel & Flanders, supra note 157, at 957, 987. 
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IV. THE PROPOSED MODEL 
A. The Criminal Law Lead 
Criminal lawmakers and scholars have long realized that monetary 
sanctions such as fines have several advantages over incarceration. Most 
importantly, fines have lower administrative costs, they are transferred to 
the state thereby increasing rather than decreasing its funds, and they 
compensate society in addition to punishing offenders.175 With this 
understanding, lawmakers and scholars have tried to develop an optimal 
fining method for the criminal justice system. The most common method 
is fixed fines—where the extent of the fine is based on the severity of the 
offense. This method has two apparent flaws. First, wealthier individuals 
might be less responsive to changes in fine amounts, due to the 
diminishing marginal utility of income. This theoretical insight has 
empirical support.176 The deterrent effect of fixed fines might therefore be 
inconsistent. Second, because a fixed fine for a particular offense has a 
different impact on people with different income, the severity of the 
sanction imposed on the offender is in fact not correlated with the gravity 
of the offense. This violates the principle of retribution. In other words, if 
two offenders perceive the monetary sanction imposed for a particular 
offense differently due to a difference in personal wealth, then for at least 
one of them the sanction is not truly proportionate to the offense. 
A unique feature of several European criminal law systems is the use of 
a day-fine model. A day-fine system systematically integrates not only the 
gravity of the offense, but also the offender’s wealth. It is based on a two-
stage process. In the first stage, the court assesses the severity of the 
offense, and determines the corresponding “number of days” for which a 
fine must be paid: The graver the offense, the greater the number of days. 
In the second stage, the court estimates the offender’s financial condition 
and sets the “daily unit.” This unit usually constitutes a fraction of the 
offender’s daily income. For example, the daily unit in Finland is roughly 
50% of the offender’s net daily income.177 A certain amount may be 
                                                      
175.  Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 
179–80 (1968). Becker explained that the costs of punishment can be reduced by replacing 
imprisonment with pecuniary sanctions. Unlike fines, imprisonment imposes costs both on the 
offender and on society (primarily the costs of building and maintaining prisons and of hiring and 
training guards). Thus, according to economic theory, fines should be used to the extent possible 
before turning to other forms of penalty. 
176.  See Avner Bar-Ilan & Bruce Sacerdote, The Response of Criminals and Noncriminals to 
Fines, 47 J. L. & ECON. 1, 2, 16 (2004) (concluding that wealthier criminals are less responsive to fine 
increases). 
177.  CRIM. CODE ch.2 (a), § 2(2) (Fin.) provides that “[o]ne sixtieth of the average monthly 
income of the person fined, less the taxes and fees defined by a Decree and a fixed deduction for basic 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
862 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 95:835 
 
 
 
deducted to allow for the basic needs of the offender and of his or her 
dependents.178 The total fine imposed thus equals the number of days, 
which depends on the severity of the offense, multiplied by the daily unit, 
which depends on the offender’s financial condition. Although the 
nominal amount paid may differ across offenders who have committed the 
same offense, the relative burden of the punishment is similar. 
Assume, for example, that two similar offenders (in terms of criminal 
history), X and Y, committed a similar crime of larceny. However, the net 
daily income of offender X is $100 and the daily income of offender Y is 
$20. In the first stage the judge will determine the number of fine-days 
that fit the severity of the crime. Assume ten days comply with the gravity 
of the particular larceny. In the second stage, depending on each 
offender’s daily income, the court determines the daily unit of the fine. 
This may be set at 50% of the net daily income, as explained above.179 In 
this case, the daily unit of the fine is $50 for offender X and $10 for 
offender Y. Finally, the court needs to multiply the number of days by the 
daily unit. As a result, the fine imposed on offender X is 10×$50=$500. 
Offender Y will pay 10×$10=$100 for the same crime. This example 
demonstrates that the nominal fine is different for the two offenders. 
Nevertheless, the relative burden imposed on them by this sanction is 
similar, namely 50% of their ten-day income. 
The idea of wealth-dependent criminal punishment was mentioned by 
Jeremy Bentham in the nineteenth century,180 but was not endorsed by any 
legal system before the twentieth century. The first country to introduce 
day-fines was Finland in 1921.181 Other Scandinavian countries followed 
                                                                                                                           
consumption, is deemed to be a reasonable amount of a day fine.” See also Tapio Lappi-Seppälä, 
Imprisonment and Penal Policy in Finland, in 54 SCANDINAVIAN STUD. L. 333, 336 (Peter Wahlgren 
ed., 2009) (describing the Finnish day-fines system). 
178.  CRIM. CODE ch.2 (a), § 2(2) (Fin.). 
179.  For simplicity’s sake, we do not take into account the possible deduction to allow for 
“basic needs.” 
180.  2 JEREMY BENTHAM, THEORY OF LEGISLATION 129, 143 (Charles M. Atkinson trans., 
1914) (1802):  
Punishments the same in name are not always the same in reality. Age, sex, rank, fortune . . . 
ought to modify the penalties imposed for offences of the same character . . . [A] given 
pecuniary penalty might prove a bagatelle to the rich man, and act of cruel oppression when 
inflicted on his poorer neighbor . . . .  
Punishment ought . . . to correspond with [the offenders’] various measures of sensitivity . . . 
otherwise, punishments nominally the same, being found too severe for some persons and too 
mild for others, will now overshoot the mark . . . A fine, fixed by law at a given amount, can 
never be a punishment possessing this kind of equality, by reason of the great disparity in the 
fortunes of different offenders. 
181.  Hans-Jörg Albrecht, Sanction Policies and Alternative Measures to Incarceration: 
European Experiences with Intermediate and Alternative Criminal Penalties, UNITED NATIONS ASIA 
& FAR EAST INST. FOR PREVENTION CRIME AND TREATMENT OFFENDERS RESOURCE MATERIAL 
SERIES NO. 80 at 28, 33 (2009), http://www.unafei.or.jp/english/pdf/RS_No80/No80_07VE_A 
lbrecht.pdf. 
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suit (e.g., Sweden in 1931 and Denmark in 1939).182 However, only 
several decades later did other European countries adopt a day-fine model. 
These include Germany and Austria (1975), Hungary (1978), France and 
Portugal (1983),183 Spain (1995), Poland (1997), and Switzerland 
(2007).184 Yet, to this day, some European countries, such as Belgium, 
Iceland, Italy, the Netherlands, and Norway, still maintain the fixed-fine 
system.185 The UK legislature adopted a day-fine system in 1991. While 
judicial resistance caused its abolition after a few months, a debate on 
reintroducing day-fines is ongoing.186 This method was also endorsed in 
the early twentieth century by many Latin American systems, including 
Argentina, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela.187 
Several jurisdictions in the United States experimented with day-
fines,188 but only a few states have retained them, and to a very limited 
extent compared to European jurisdictions.189 The first jurisdiction to 
experiment with day-fines for low-level offenses was Richmond County in 
Staten Island, New York, in 1988.190 The results of this experiment were 
positive, and similar experiments were held in Milwaukee (Wisconsin), 
Maricopa County (Arizona), Polk County (Iowa), Bridgeport 
(Connecticut), and several counties in Oregon.191 At least three states—
Alabama, Alaska, and Oklahoma—allow day-fines in limited 
circumstances.192 Unfortunately, the American experience with day-fines 
has been so limited and sporadic that one cannot make general 
observations or conclusions about its reception and success, or compare it 
with the vast and long-standing European experience. 
The particulars of a day-fine regime may vary. Jurisdictions differ, inter 
alia, in the types of offenses for which day-fines can be imposed, the scope 
of the income included in the calculation, the fraction used to calculate the 
                                                      
182.  Id. at 34; EDWIN W. ZEDLEWSKI, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DOCUMENT NO. NCJ 230401, 
ALTERNATIVES TO CUSTODIAL SUPERVISION: THE DAY FINE 3 (2010), 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/230401.pdf. 
183.  Albrecht, supra note 181. 
184.  Elena Kantorowicz-Reznichenko, Day-Fines: Should the Rich Pay More?, 11 REV. L. & 
ECON. 481, 485 (2015). 
185.  Albrecht, supra note 181 at 34–35. 
186.  ANDREW ASHWORTH, SENTENCING AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 348–50 (6th ed. 2015). 
187.  ZEDLEWSKI, supra note 182, at 3.. 
188.  JUDITH GREENE & CHARLES WORZELLA, DAY FINES IN AMERICAN COURTS: THE STATEN 
ISLAND AND MILWAUKEE EXPERIMENTS (Douglas C. McDonald ed., 1992), https://csgjusticecen 
ter.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/1992-day-fines-in-Staten-Island-Milwaukee.pdf. 
189.  See ZEDLEWSKI, supra note 182, at 5–6. 
190.  Id. at 5. 
191.  Id at 5–6. 
192.  See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-25-32(2)(b)(8) (2017) (allowing day-fines in limited 
circumstances); ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.036 (repealed in 2009) (same); OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 
991a(A)(y) (2017) (same). 
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daily unit, the upper and lower nominal limits on a daily unit, the 
minimum and maximum number of days on the fining spectrum, and the 
ratio between day-fines and prison times in case of default. For example, 
while there is no uniformity across countries with respect to imposing a 
nominal cap on the daily unit (Finland and Denmark do not have statutory 
caps), all systems that employ day-fines limit the number of days in the 
calculation.193 This practice is consistent with other forms of (non-
monetary) punishment wherein legislatures usually set upper limits on the 
duration of the suffering, such as imprisonment (aside from life 
imprisonment)194 or community service.195  
B. Tort Law Adaptation 
As demonstrated in Part II, punitive damages serve two goals which are 
usually associated with criminal law: deterrence and retribution. As 
explained in Part III, the defendants’ wealth may be relevant in achieving 
these goals, specifically when illicit gains are unobservable or when the 
perceived “punitive bite” of a punitive damages award depends on one’s 
level of wealth. These two facts make day-fines, which aim to achieve the 
same goals with the same acknowledgement of the importance of 
wrongdoers’ wealth, an appealing reference point in restructuring punitive 
damages. In this section, we develop a model of income-dependent 
punitive damages. Admittedly, in some jurisdictions, implementing this 
model may require legislative intervention, but such intervention is 
definitely not unprecedented in this area of law.196 In Parts V and VI, we 
investigate whether this model serves the goals described in Parts II and 
III and can overcome constitutional, statutory, and procedural constraints. 
To adapt the day-fine model to tort law, three steps must be taken. 
First, if the judge or jury concludes that punitive damages may be 
warranted, it must assess the appropriate level of the overall monetary 
sanction. To do so, it must determine the number of “severity units,” 
reflecting the relative gravity of the specific wrong, calculate the “daily 
unit,” which is the wrongdoer’s daily income or a preset fraction 
                                                      
193.  For a summary of the differences, see Kantorowicz-Reznichenko, supra note 184, at 486. 
194.  See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 775.082 (2017) (“A person who has been convicted of a designated 
misdemeanor may be sentenced as follows: (a) For a misdemeanor of the first degree, by a definite 
term of imprisonment not exceeding 1 year; (b) For a misdemeanor of the second degree, by a definite 
term of imprisonment not exceeding 60 days.”); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.15 (2017) (“A sentence of 
imprisonment for a class A misdemeanor shall be a definite sentence. When such a sentence is 
imposed the term shall be fixed by the court, and shall not exceed one year . . . .”). 
195.  See, e.g., Art. 1:22c para. 2 SR (Neth.). (setting a 240-hour limit on community service); 
Community Service by Offenders (Hours of Work) (Scotland) Order 1996, SI 1938, ¶ 3 (setting a 300-
hour limit). 
196.  See supra notes 37–39.  
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thereof,197 and multiply the two variables. The product constitutes “total 
damages,” the upper limit of the defendant’s liability, to the extent that it 
is greater than compensatory damages (as explained below). If clear 
guidelines are set in advance, and relevant evidence about the wrongdoer’s 
income is readily available, this calculation should be straightforward.  
To provide certainty and avoid inconsistent (hence unfair) penalties, the 
law must determine in advance how total damages in cases requiring a 
punitive award are to be calculated. The importance of predetermined 
guidelines cannot be overstated. Any penalty must be reasonably 
predictable in its severity to enable every person to know what the stakes 
are in choosing one course of action or another.198 Moreover, a punitive 
scheme must be consistent, imposing similar sanctions for similar 
wrongs.199 Unpredictability of high punitive awards is in tension with their 
punitive function because of the implication of unfairness that an 
eccentrically high punitive verdict carries.200 The current legal 
framework—with the single-digit limit on the punitive-to-compensatory 
damages ratio201—promises some level of certainty.202 However, empirical 
studies demonstrate that this guidepost is insufficient. For example, one 
study found that the punitive-to-compensatory damages ratio was higher in 
jury trials than in bench trials,203 undermining the twin goals of punitive 
damages. Moreover, the punitive-to-compensatory damages ratio can 
hardly be defended in terms of the theoretical justifications of punitive 
damages.204 A superior model will align with these justifications and 
provide greater predictability. 
Thus, lawmakers must first set up an index—a formula or guidelines 
for associating the severity of the conduct with the number of severity 
units that the wrongdoer must pay. To fulfill the proportionality 
requirements, the number of severity units should increase with the 
reprehensibility of the misconduct.205 Such guidelines were introduced in 
the American day-fine pilots in the 1980s.206 For instance, in the Staten 
                                                      
197.  In criminal day-fine systems, the “daily unit” is often based on a certain portion of the 
offender’s daily income. Lawmakers may similarly limit the unit value in the proposed punitive 
damages model. 
198.  Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 502 (2008); see also Schwartz, supra note 5, 
at 141 (“From a deterrence standpoint, it confounds understanding to permit such vast uncertainty as to 
the level of the expected penalty.”). 
199.  Exxon Shipping, 554 U.S. at 502. 
200.  Id. at 499–501. 
201.  State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 426 (2003). 
202.  See Eisenberg & Heise, supra note 5, at 327 (finding that the variation in punitive damages 
awards is largely a function of variation in the underlying compensatory award). 
203.  Id. at 328. 
204.  Sharkey, supra note 2, at 500. 
205.  See infra Section V.B.  
206.  GREENE & WORZELLA, supra note 188 at 13, 24. 
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Island experiment, the number of fine-days that could be imposed for 
offenses against the person ranged from 17–23 days in cases of minor 
injury to an acquaintance to 81–109 days in cases of a substantial injury to 
a stranger.207 A similarly structured index can be used in tort actions. Note, 
however, that a wrongdoer is already liable for the victim’s harm, so some 
correlation between the severity of the injury and that of the sanction 
exists. More importantly, the key factor in assessing punitive damages is 
the reprehensibility of the conduct, not the severity of the injury in itself. 
Next, lawmakers must determine how a unit value, and more 
specifically the defendant’s daily income, should be evaluated. 
Particularly, they must decide whether and how to take into account 
passive income and possibly the defendant’s net use value of his or her 
own property, such as a household or a car. In theory, to avoid under-
deterrence and under-punishment, the daily share should encompass all 
sources of wealth, not only income from work. A comprehensive income 
measure is used in the German and Swedish day-fines models.208 
Admittedly, evaluating a person’s daily income might not be easy, so our 
proposal is viable only if courts can obtain information about defendants’ 
income from reliable sources, such as the tax authorities. We shall return 
to this concern below.209 Lastly, if the basic unit is not the wrongdoer’s 
entire daily income, the exact percentage and any deductions must also be 
determined in advance.  
The second step is the deduction of compensatory damages from total 
damages. Punitive damages are sums awarded to tort victims over and 
above their compensable harm. If total damages are greater than 
compensatory damages in a particular case, the punitive award should 
equal the difference between total damages and compensatory damages. If 
total damages are lower than compensatory damages, punitive damages 
should be nil. In such cases the monetary sanction that would serve the 
twin goals of punitive damages (deterrence and retribution) is lower than 
compensatory damages. However, as long as tort law is committed to 
rectification of harm, compensatory damages set the lower limit of the 
monetary award.  
To illustrate the proposed model, assume that Z was assaulted in a bar 
fight, and incurred a $200 injury. Assume further that the number of 
severity units attached to recklessly inflicting minor personal injury under 
                                                      
207.  Id. at 24. 
208.  See STRAFGESETZBUCH [StGB] [PENAL CODE], § 40, para. 3, translation at 
https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stgb/englisch_stgb.html (Ger.) (“The income of the 
offender, his assets and other relevant assessment factors may be estimated when setting the amount of 
a daily unit.”); Lina Eriksson & Robert E. Goodin, The Measuring Rod of Time: The Example of 
Swedish Day-fines, 24 J. APPLIED PHIL. 125, 130 (2007) (discussing Swedish law). 
209.  See infra Section VI.C. 
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the preset guidelines is ten, and that the unit value is 50% of the 
wrongdoer’s daily income. Now, if the injury was caused by X, whose 
daily income is $100, total damages are $100×10×0.5=$500. X will have 
to pay $200 in compensatory damages and $500˗$200=$300 in punitive 
damages. If the injury was caused by Y, whose daily income is $20, total 
damages are $20×10×0.5=$100. Y will have to pay compensatory 
damages in the amount of $200 and no punitive damages. 
While current doctrine enables courts to award extra-compensatory 
damages to secure proper deterrence and retribution, it does not allow 
courts to award sub-compensatory damages to secure proper deterrence 
and retribution. If law and policymakers decide that the compensatory goal 
may be subject to deterrence and retribution, courts may be allowed to 
award sub-compensatory damages when the compensatory level exceeds 
“total damages.” In addition to all arguments made above, which focused 
on general and individual deterrence, awarding sub-compensatory 
damages may sometimes be justified in terms of marginal deterrence, as 
recognized by economic theorists in the related area of criminal fines.210 
Low-income potential wrongdoers might not be able to fully pay 
compensatory damages. These might be induced to commit more severe 
wrongs, because the expected benefit will increase, whereas the expected 
cost—capped by their solvency—will not. A reform allowing sub-
compensatory damages has some merit, but it transcends the boundaries of 
this Article. 
The third step is the consideration of other applicable sanctions. 
Because “total damages” set an upper limit to liability, courts awarding 
punitive damages must determine whether this limit has already been 
reached through criminal fines and other civil sanctions imposed on the 
defendant for the same conduct.211 If the aggregate of all monetary 
sanctions exceeds “total damages,” punitive damages should not be 
awarded at all. For example, assume total damages equal $10,000 and 
compensatory damages are $4,000. If a criminal fine in the amount of 
$6,000 was imposed on the wrongdoer for the same wrongdoing, the court 
should not award punitive damages. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
210.  C.Y. Cyrus Chu & Neville Jiang, Are Fines More Efficient than Imprisonment?, 51 J. PUB. 
ECON. 391 passim (1993). 
211.  Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 21–22 (1991). 
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V. THEORETICAL DEFENSE OF THE MODEL 
A. Deterrence 
As Part III demonstrated, the defendant’s wealth may be relevant to 
deterrence if punitive damages are imposed to secure internalization, and 
potential injurers are risk-averse and do not have access to liability 
insurance, or if they are imposed to disgorge an illicit gain, which is 
unobservable and correlated with the defendant’s wealth. Under current 
law, the extent of punitive damages awards depends on the three 
guideposts set forth in BMW v. Gore.212 In reviewing punitive damages 
awards, courts ought to consider the reprehensibility of the defendant’s 
misconduct; the disparity between the plaintiff’s actual or potential harm 
and the punitive damages award; and the difference between the punitive 
damages award and the civil or criminal penalties authorized or imposed 
in comparable cases. Apart from examining the level of reprehensibility, 
these guideposts focus on factors which are external to the defendant. 
Therefore, similar wrongs are expected to result in equal punitive damages 
awards in absolute terms. 
If socially illicit gain is correlated with wealth213 and the marginal 
utility of individual wealth is diminishing,214 a wealthier wrongdoer’s 
willingness to pay for committing the wrong is higher than that of a low-
income injurer. In such circumstances, a fixed punitive damages award, 
just like fixed fines in criminal law, might under-deter the wealthier.215 
Under-deterrence will occur when the defendant’s willingness to pay for 
the pleasure of causing harm exceeds the sum of compensatory and 
punitive damages. The problem of under-deterrence of wealthier offenders 
was one of the justifications for introducing day-fines in the criminal 
justice system,216 and it is equally relevant in the case of punitive damages. 
                                                      
212.  See supra notes 42–52 and accompanying text.  
213.  Hylton, supra note 5, at 936–38.  
214.  See ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS 167–68 (8th ed. 
2012) (discussing diminishing marginal utility of wealth).  
215.  This argument is theoretical and based on the utility function. To the best of our 
knowledge, there are no empirical studies systematically comparing the deterrent effect of fixed fines 
and day-fines. Most studies on day-fines focus on payment rates, which are very important in the 
criminal law context, because offenders who fail to pay their fines are often imprisoned. One of the 
empirically established advantages of day-fines is higher payment rates. See, e.g., LAURA L. 
WINTERFIELD & SALLY T. HILLSMAN, THE STATEN ISLAND DAY-FINE PROJECT, NAT’L INST. OF 
JUSTICE: RESEARCH IN BRIEF 1, 3 (1993). Forasmuch as imprisonment is not available in tort law, 
reducing default rates is irrelevant to our analysis. Older studies demonstrated that day-fines were 
better in reducing reconviction rates than probation and imprisonment with respect to property crimes 
of non-career criminals. See, e.g., Hans-Jörg Albrecht & Elmer H. Johnson, Fines and Justice 
Administration: The Experience of the Federal Republic of Germany, 4 INT’L J. COMP. & APPLIED 
CRIM. JUST. 3, 12–13 (1980). 
216.  See, e.g., Eriksson & Goodin, supra note 208, at 129 (discussing the Swedish system). 
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Assuming a certain activity, such as defamation, is undesirable 
behavior that tort law seeks to eradicate, we would like to set “price 
discrimination” where punitive damages equal the minimum extent of 
damages that can deter such behavior. In terms of marginal utility, to deter 
a wrongdoer from causing harm, the utility loss from “total damages” 
needs to be equal to or higher than the wrongdoer’s utility gain from his 
misconduct. And if the gain is correlated with wealth,217 “total damages” 
ought to increase with the level of wealth to achieve the same utility 
loss.218 Figure 2 illustrates this for two wrongdoers with a similar utility 
function and different levels of wealth. 
 
 
Figure 2. Equalizing Utility Loss 
 
The Figure demonstrates that in order to impose an equal utility loss Y 
(which fits the particular wrong), “total damages” should equal X for the 
poorer wrongdoer, and X+A for the wealthier. Sufficient deterrence might 
entail variance in the unit value. In other words, if the purpose of the 
reform is proper price discrimination, the portion of wealth taken into 
account in calculating “total damages” should vary in accordance with the 
defendant’s personal wealth and utility function. However, courts cannot 
ascertain individual utility functions, and are therefore unable to calculate 
                                                      
217.  Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 5, at 913.  
218.  Our analysis is limited to individuals. As explained above, corporations are generally risk-
neutral and are not motivated by socially illicit gains. Therefore, punitive damages imposed on 
corporations should be independent of their wealth. See supra notes 153–156 and accompanying text. 
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the impact of monetary sanctions on different individuals in terms of 
utility. Using equal portions of wealth (or income) when determining 
“total damages,” as in the criminal day-fines model, is a reasonable 
second-best choice. 
An additional advantage of an income-dependent punitive damages 
system is the enhancement of marginal deterrence. If punitive damages are 
fixed for similar misconducts resulting in comparable harms, marginal 
deterrence has a limit—reached when the monetary sanction equals the 
defendant’s wealth. Once “total damages” equal or exceed the defendant’s 
entire wealth, he or she no longer has an incentive to choose a less severe 
misconduct. In the economics literature of criminal law, this limitation 
justifies the imposition of imprisonment.219 Nevertheless, imprisonment is 
not available in tort law, rendering alternative guarantees for marginal 
deterrence crucial. The proposed model translates the gravity of the 
misconduct into the number of severity units (which is independent of 
wealth). Therefore, the more egregious the conduct, the greater the number 
of severity units. Since the absolute extent of punitive damages is 
determined by a proportion of the defendant’s income, marginal deterrence 
is not limited by the defendant’s wealth. This advantage does not hold if 
“total damages” are lower than compensatory damages. In such 
circumstances, punitive damages will be nil and remain nil at least with 
some increases in the level of reprehensibility.  
Finally, taking into account the wrongdoer’s wealth is necessary to 
avoid over-deterrence in performing activities which are not undesirable 
per se. Sometimes, potential wrongdoers cannot obtain insurance coverage 
for punitive damages, either because the market does not provide such 
coverage,220 possibly due to moral-hazard problems, or because the law 
prohibits such coverage on public policy grounds.221 As explained above, 
poorer wrongdoers may be more risk-averse than wealthier ones.222 Thus, 
in the absence of insurance, imposing an identical monetary sanction will 
have a different impact in terms of utility on people with different levels of 
wealth. The expected utility loss generated by a particular monetary 
sanction will be greater for poorer potential wrongdoers, resulting in 
greater willingness to invest in excessive precautions or to engage in 
                                                      
219.  Chu & Jiang, supra note 210 passim; Steven Shavell, Criminal Law and the Optimal Use 
of Nonmonetary Sanctions as a Deterrent, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1232 (1985).  
220.  See, e.g., Benjamin P. Cooper, The Lawyer's Duty to Inform His Client of His Own 
Malpractice, 61 BAYLOR L. REV. 174, 212–13 (2009) (“The possibility of punitive damages is 
particularly significant since many malpractice insurers do not cover punitive damages.”). 
221.  See Michael A. Rosenhouse, Annotation, Liability Insurance Coverage as Extending to 
Liability for Punitive or Exemplary Damages, 16 A.L.R.4th 11 (1982) (discussing relevant case law). 
For a more recent analysis of case law, see Fairfield Ins. Co. v. Stephens Martin Paving, L.P., 246 
S.W.3d 653, 688 (Tex. 2008) (Hecht, J., concurring). 
222.  Supra Section III.B; see also Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 5, at 913. 
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suboptimal levels of activity. While the proposed model falls short of 
eliminating this problem, it may help ameliorate it. 
B. Retribution 
Retribution seems to pose a more serious challenge to our model. To 
recap, it is a form of justice that stresses the proportionality between the 
gravity of the wrong and the severity of the sanction.223 For income-
dependent punitive damages to meet the standard of retribution, they must 
fulfill the requirements of cardinal and ordinal proportionality. At first 
sight, some difficulties are evident. With respect to cardinal 
proportionality, there might be rare cases in which an exceptionally 
wealthy wrongdoer commits a minor tort. Based on the suggested model, 
“total damages” might be very high in absolute terms, and seem 
incompatible with the gravity of the conduct. The European experience 
with day-fines in criminal law provides a prominent example. In 2001, a 
director of Nokia was given a $103,600 fine for speeding in Finland.224 
Similarly, our model does not seem to comply with the principle of ordinal 
proportionality if we look at “total damages” in absolute terms. For 
instance, the proposed model might oblige a wealthy wrongdoer to pay 
$10,000 in damages for publicly insulting another person, while an 
indigent wrongdoer would only pay $1,000 for physically assaulting 
another. This seems to go against ordinal proportionality, which requires a 
graver misconduct to be punished by a more severe sanction (higher 
damages). 
There are two possible rejoinders to these concerns. First, the proposed 
model is unique: it requires careful interpretation of the theory rather than 
straightforward application. Forasmuch as this model consists of two 
independent components—the number of severity units and the unit value, 
compliance with the proportionality test should not be evaluated by the 
nominal value of “total damages” but in view of the first component 
(severity). In other words, in an income-dependent punitive damages 
system, the gravity of the misconduct and the severity of the sanction are 
captured by the number of severity units. With respect to wealth-
dependent sanctions, such as day-fines in criminal law and income-
dependent punitive damages in torts, the number of days or severity units, 
rather than the nominal awards, may serve the expressive function of 
punishment. For instance, Swedish media reports the number of fine-days 
                                                      
223.  See supra Section II.C.  
224.  Nokia Boss Gets Record Speeding Fine, BBC NEWS (Jan. 14, 2002, 2:29 PM), 
https://perma.cc/RQ7F-B4GF. 
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imposed on convicted offenders rather than focusing on the total amount 
of the fine.225 
Lawmakers can establish guidelines attaching specific ranges of 
severity units to different types of misconduct, depending on their gravity. 
Alternatively, courts may use the factors, recognized as relevant in 
determining the degree of reprehensibility, as a tool for determining the 
number of severity units on a case-by-case basis. These factors include the 
type of harm, the victim’s vulnerability, the injurer’s intentional malice, 
the repetitive nature of the conduct, etc.226 If this suggested interpretation 
is followed, the requirements of cardinal and ordinal proportionality are 
met. With respect to cardinal proportionality, it is possible to set upper and 
lower limits to the number of severity units attached to each type of 
wrongdoing. For instance, in the Staten Island experiment with day-fines, 
the range of fine-days was 5–120.227 This range was deemed appropriate 
considering the gravity of the misdemeanors included in the experiment. 
Moreover, a specific range was set for each offense, allowing flexibility 
and judicial discretion in light of mitigating and aggravating circumstances 
in specific cases.228 To the extent that the number of severity units is 
within a range that “fits” the absolute gravity of the wrong, cardinal 
proportionality is attained. Similarly, an index that makes the number (or 
range) of severity units contingent on the reprehensibility of the conduct 
ensures that the punitive award reflects the relative gravity of the conduct, 
as required by ordinal proportionality.229 
An additional rejoinder is related to our general discussion of the need 
to take the defendant’s wealth into account in assessing punitive 
damages.230 Many retributivists believe that the wrongdoer’s wealth 
should not be disregarded when pecuniary penalties are imposed.231 
Retributive justice requires that the level of the defendant’s suffering be 
proportional to the wrong he has committed. Under the current system and 
the three guideposts,232 two wrongdoers liable for an equally reprehensible 
misconduct might face the same punitive damages award in nominal 
                                                      
225.  Eriksson & Goodin, supra note 208, at 131. Thus, when a person was convicted of two 
minor drug offenses and DUI, the media reported his sentence as 70 days of a 50 kronor fine. Matilda 
Ermeland, Dagsböter för Knarkbrott, SUNDSVALLS TIDNING (Nov. 17, 2015), 
https://perma.cc/MA6W-ZRPC. 
226.  See Baker v. Exxon Mobile Corp., 490 F.3d 1066, 1085–89 (9th Cir. 2007) (discussing the 
relevant reprehensibility factors), rev’d on other grounds, 554 U.S. 471 (2016). 
227.  Greene, supra note 206, at 22. 
228.  Id. at 23–24. 
229.  A system in which mitigating and aggravating factors are considered on a case-by-case 
basis may also be used in a tort adaptation. The downside is additional complication and higher 
administrative costs. 
230.  Supra Section III.B. 
231.  See supra notes 163–164 and accompanying text.  
232.  See supra notes 42–52 and accompanying text. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol95/iss4/6
 
 
 
 
 
 
2018] INCOME-DEPENDENT PUNITIVE DAMAGES 873 
 
 
 
terms. However, every given amount constitutes a different portion of each 
wrongdoer’s income or wealth. A $1,000 award constitutes 10% of a 
$10,000 monthly income, and 80% of a $1,250 monthly income. Thus, it 
is reasonable to assume that the suffering of the person with the lower 
income is greater than that of the person with the higher income. If the 
level of reprehensibility is equal, then from a retributive justice 
perspective, a nominally equal punitive award cannot be deemed 
proportionate to the wrong for both wrongdoers. The proposed model, 
albeit not without flaws, offers a potential solution. Given the diminishing 
marginal utility of wealth (see Figure 2), obliging the wealthier wrongdoer 
to pay the same portion of his or her income as the poorer wrongdoer 
closes the gap between the levels of suffering which would exist if the 
defendant’s wealth were ignored. Aligning the monetary sanction with the 
wrongdoer’s wealth is more likely to achieve proportionality between the 
gravity of the wrong and the severity of the sanction as actually 
experienced by wrongdoers. 
The question is which portion of a wrongdoer’s wealth should be set as 
the basis for the daily unit of income-dependent punitive damages in order 
to achieve proportionality between the gravity of the conduct and the 
severity of the sanction. Intuitively, a loss of 50% of one’s wealth will 
impose a different burden on people with different initial wealth, even if 
the utility function is identical for all. To illustrate this point, let us return 
to the case of Moe, Larry, and Curly.233 As before, assume the three have 
an identical utility function, y=10,000log(x/10,000+1). Moe has 
$10,000,000, Larry $1,000,000, and Curly $100,000. If total damages 
constitute 50% of each wrongdoer’s wealth, Moe will be obliged to pay 
$5,000,000, Larry $500,000, and Curly $50,000 (assuming the actual harm 
does not exceed $50,000). Inserting these amounts into the utility function 
will result in a loss of 3,006 utility units for Moe, 2,968 utility units for 
Larry, and 2,632 utility units for Curly.234 This example demonstrates two 
important features of the proposed model. First, it closes the gaps between 
utility losses incurred by perpetrators of similar wrongs who have different 
levels of wealth, created by a system based on proportionality between the 
extent of punitive damages and the gravity of the wrong. Second, this 
model does not close these gaps completely. Put differently, even income-
dependent punitive damages do not guarantee that equal wrongdoing will 
result in equally burdensome sanctions. And variance in individual utility 
functions surely exacerbates the problem. 
                                                      
233.  See supra Section III.B.  
234.  Utility losses are calculated as follows (x being the wrongdoer’s initial wealth): 
10,000log(x/10,000+1)−10,000log(0.5x/10,000+1). 
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Ideally, “total damages” should be adjusted in accordance with each 
wrongdoer’s personal wealth and utility function. However, this is clearly 
impractical: courts cannot ascertain individual utility functions and are 
unable to calculate the impact of monetary sanctions on different 
individuals in terms of utility. The proposed model uses a flat fraction of 
the wrongdoer’s daily income as the unit value. For example, “total 
damages” for two wrongdoers responsible for an equally reprehensible 
wrong may be calculated by multiplying 50% of each wrongdoer’s daily 
income (the unit value) by the number of severity units. This is clearly a 
second-best solution from a retributive perspective. To be sure, it does not 
provide perfect individualization of total damages. However, it brings the 
assessment of punitive damages closer to that required by the principles of 
retributive justice. And it has the important advantages of practicability 
and predictability. 
VI. CHALLENGES AND CONCERNS 
Even if the proposed model achieves the twin goals of punitive 
damages, deterrence and retribution, it needs to be evaluated in light of 
existing constitutional and statutory constraints. In this Part we first 
analyze potential constitutional challenges. Next, we investigate the 
legislative reforms that adopting the proposed model may entail. Finally, 
we review the rules on information discovery in civil cases, in order to 
assess the practicability of an income-based calculation of damages.  
A. Constitutional Constraints 
The constitutional challenge concerns the prohibition on excessive 
sanctions. Although the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth 
Amendment235 does not apply to punitive damages awards in civil cases 
between private parties,236 punitive damages are subject to the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.237 The latter forbids states from 
depriving persons of “life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law.” According to the Supreme Court, a punitive damages award violates 
the Due Process Clause if it is grossly excessive (“substantive due 
                                                      
235.  U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
236.  Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 263–64, 275–76 
(1989). 
237.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 
416 (2003); Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 433–34 (2001); BMW 
of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 562–63 (1996); TXO Prod. Corp. v. All. Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 
443, 453–55 (1993). 
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process”), or imposed without a fair procedure (“procedural due 
process”).238 
Taking the defendant’s wealth into account in assessing punitive 
damages does not in itself violate the Due Process Clause. In fact, starting 
in the 1980s, courts have used the defendant’s wealth to refute fears that 
punitive awards are excessive.239 In Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. 
Haslip,240 the Supreme Court mentioned several factors taken into account 
in determining whether a punitive damages award was excessive or 
inadequate, including the three guideposts subsequently endorsed in BMW, 
and the “financial position” of the defendant. The Court held that these 
factors imposed a “sufficiently definite and meaningful constraint on the 
discretion of . . . fact finders in awarding punitive damages.”241 In TXO 
Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp.,242 the Court found that 
although the punitive award was very large, it was not grossly excessive, 
in part due to the defendant’s wealth. In BMW, the Court explained that 
the defendant’s wealth was a relevant consideration, because a fixed 
amount of punitive damages would punish wealthy and poor wrongdoers 
differently.243 In line with these rulings, some state legislatures have 
explicitly instructed or permitted courts to consider the defendant’s 
financial condition and net worth when assessing excessiveness of 
punitive damages.244 
True, in State Farm v. Campbell245 the Supreme Court opined that 
“[t]he wealth of a defendant cannot justify an otherwise unconstitutional 
punitive damages award.” Because it is clear that no court can justify or 
affirm an unconstitutional award, the Court’s statement could be 
understood as a direction to lower courts not to use wealth as the primary 
basis for determining a punitive award. The defendant’s wealth is not 
totally irrelevant, but relying on it is subject to the general constitutional 
constraints. We turn, therefore, to the challenges that the three BMW v. 
Gore246 guideposts might present to the proposed model. 
                                                      
238.  See Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 353–55 (2007) (explaining that punitive 
damages are subject to both substantive and procedural due process). 
239.  See, e.g., Hatrock v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 750 F.2d 767, 773 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding 
that the punitive award was not excessive because it represented only 0.33% of the defendant’s gross 
revenues).  
240.  499 U.S. 1, 21–22 (1991). 
241.  Id. at 22. 
242.  509 U.S. 443, 462 (1993). 
243.  BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 591 (1996) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
244.  See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 768.72(1) (2017); IOWA CODE § 668A.1 (2017); KAN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 60-3701(b)(6) (2017); MINN. STAT. § 549.20(3) (2017); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-65(1)(f)(ii)(3) 
(2017); MO. REV. STAT. § 510.263(2) (2017); NEV. REV. STAT. § 42.005(4) (2017). 
245.  538 U.S. 408, 427 (2003). 
246.  517 U.S. at 575–85. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
876 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 95:835 
 
 
 
First, punitive damages should be aligned with the degree of 
reprehensibility of the defendant’s misconduct. For instance, the Court in 
BMW v. Gore criticized Alabama’s statute for not making a distinction 
between serious misrepresentation (“tricking the elderly out of their life 
savings”) and minor representation (failing to disclose minor repairs of a 
new car before sale).247 As mentioned above, reprehensibility of the 
conduct can be expressed in “severity units” (or a number of days). A 
suitable range of “severity units” for each level of reprehensibility or for 
each category of misconduct can be provided by preset guidelines. Thus, 
the difference between serious and minor misrepresentations can be 
reflected in different ranges of severity units. Moreover, fine-tuning the 
monetary sanction on the basis of wrongdoers’ wealth generates more 
accurate proportionality between the gravity of the wrong and the severity 
of the sanction as actually experienced by wrongdoers. To the extent that 
the impact of sanctions on wrongdoers is important in determining their 
severity, the proposed model seems more consistent with the constitutional 
imperative. 
Second, BMW requires consideration of the ratio between punitive and 
compensatory damages. This guidepost seems to reduce the proposed 
model’s feasibility. Although the Supreme Court has refused to draw a 
clear line between constitutionally acceptable and unacceptable ratios,248 it 
has provided instructive observations. For example, in Haslip,249 and then 
again in BMW,250 the Court concluded that an award of more than four 
times the amount of compensatory damages might be close to 
constitutional impropriety.251 In State Farm it opined that single-digit 
ratios were more likely to conform to due process than higher ratios.252 
Because compensatory damages depend on the plaintiff’s harm, and 
punitive damages under the proposed model depend on the defendant’s 
wealth, the ratio between punitive and compensatory damages will 
occasionally exceed the acceptable ratio. For instance, if an especially 
wealthy wrongdoer has caused minor harm, applying the proposed model 
                                                      
247.  Id. at 589–90. 
248.  See, e.g., State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425 (“We decline again to impose a bright-line ratio 
which a punitive damages award cannot exceed.”); BMW, 517 U.S. at 582 (“Of course, we have 
consistently rejected the notion that the constitutional line is marked by a simple mathematical 
formula, even one that compares actual and potential damages to the punitive award . . . . It is 
appropriate, therefore, to reiterate our rejection of a categorical approach.”); TXO Prod. Corp. v. All. 
Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 458 (1993) (“[W]e are not prepared to enshrine petitioner’s comparative 
approach in a ‘test’ for assessing the constitutionality of punitive damages awards.”); Pac. Mut. Life 
Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18 (1991) (“We need not . . . draw a mathematical bright line between 
the constitutionally acceptable and the constitutionally unacceptable that would fit every case.”). 
249.  Haslip, 499 U.S. at 23–24. 
250.  BMW, 517 U.S. at 581. 
251.  See also State Farm, 538 U.S. at 426 (endorsing Haslip and BMW). 
252.  Id. 
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might yield a very high ratio. Allowing punitive awards above the State 
Farm single-digit guideline based on the defendant’s wealth requires 
modification, or at least reinterpretation, of State Farm itself. This would 
not be revolutionary, because the Court has never adopted a rigid range of 
acceptable ratios, and has already recognized circumstances justifying 
higher ratios.253 
Third, courts should evaluate punitive damages awards in light of other 
criminal and civil penalties imposed or authorized in comparable cases.254 
As long as the American criminal justice system applies fixed fines rather 
than day-fines, punitive damages under the proposed model might be 
incompatible with criminal sanctions imposed for similar misconduct. In 
an income-dependent punitive damages scheme, reprehensibility is 
expressed by “severity units” (or the number of days), not by the total 
amount of damages. In fixed-fines criminal systems, reprehensibility is 
expressed by the payable amount. Punitive damages under our model will 
not correlate with relevant criminal fines. Thus, implementing this model 
seems to require some adjustment of the third BMW guidepost. However, 
the Court in State Farm downplayed this guidepost. It explained that 
criminal sanctions may be used to determine “the seriousness with which a 
State views the wrongful action,” but have “less utility” in determining the 
dollar amount of punitive damages.255 Put differently, criminal sanctions 
may be considered because they indicate the relative gravity of the wrong, 
not because punitive damages must be similar in amount to relevant 
criminal sanctions. The proposed model ensures correlation between the 
punitive award and the gravity of the wrong, as reflected by relevant 
criminal sanctions, so the third guidepost is satisfied. But even if the third 
guidepost were interpreted to require correlation between the amount of 
punitive damages and relevant criminal sanctions, this would not be a 
significant obstacle. To begin with, damages can be compared not only to 
criminal fines, but also to prison terms. Correlation between the severity of 
income-dependent punitive damages and that of incarceration for a 
comparable wrong (where relevant) can be more easily attained. If the lack 
of correlation between punitive damages and criminal fines is still deemed 
inconsistent with the third guidepost, the latter should be qualified. 
Presumably, criminal sanctions have served as a benchmark due to the 
lack of clear guidelines for assessing punitive damages. Once the proposed 
                                                      
253.  BMW, 517 U.S. at 582 (“Indeed, low awards of compensatory damages may properly 
support a higher ratio than high compensatory awards, if, for example, a particularly egregious act has 
resulted in only a small amount of economic damages. A higher ratio may also be justified in cases in 
which the injury is hard to detect or the monetary value of noneconomic harm might have been 
difficult to determine.”); see also State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425 (quoting BMW). 
254.  BMW, 517 U.S. at 583–85.  
255.  State Farm, 538 U.S. at 428. 
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model provides clear guidelines, reliance on external measures becomes 
redundant anyway. 
Last but not least, the Supreme Court has repeatedly mentioned in its 
due process analysis the need to avoid “arbitrary deprivation of 
property,”256 and to ensure that the probability and extent of punitive 
damages are predictable.257 Punitive damages raise concerns in this regard. 
For example, the Court in State Farm pointed out that jury instructions 
leave juries wide discretion as to the amount of punitive damages.258 When 
such vague instructions are combined with evidence about the defendant’s 
net worth, verdicts might reflect jurors’ biases against big businesses, 
especially those without a strong local presence.259 The proposed model, if 
properly implemented, provides concrete and clear guidelines, limits 
juries’ discretion and susceptibility to bias, avoids arbitrariness, and 
introduces certainty and predictability into the system. Reprehensibility is 
expressed in severity units (or number of days), and an appropriate range 
of units can be set in advance for each category of misconduct. The 
defendant’s wealth is also incorporated into the calculation in a systematic 
and predictable manner. For example, the legislature can set the unit value 
at 50% of the defendant’s daily income. The special structure of income-
dependent damages thus has the potential to satisfy the requirements of 
due process in a better manner than the existing system.  
B. Statutory Caps 
Another obstacle to implementing the proposed model may be statutory 
caps on punitive damages. Many states limit the extent of punitive 
damages by setting an absolute cap or a maximal punitive-to-
compensatory damages ratio.260 Although some state courts have found 
these limits unconstitutional,261 they are still very common. Unfortunately, 
they may frustrate any attempt to secure deterrence and retributive justice 
through punitive damages. Specifically, if the wrong is egregious or if the 
wrongdoer is especially wealthy, “total damages” might exceed the 
                                                      
256.  Id. at 417 (“[P]unitive damages pose an acute danger of arbitrary deprivation of property. 
Jury instructions typically leave the jury with wide discretion in choosing amounts . . . .”); BMW, 517 
U.S. at 586 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“A ‘grossly excessive’ punitive award amounts to an ‘arbitrary 
deprivation of property without due process of law.’”) (quoting TXO Prod. Corp. v. All. Res. Grp., 
509 U.S. 443, 454 (1993)). 
257.  State Farm, 538 U.S. at 418 (“A State can have no legitimate interest in deliberately 
making the law so arbitrary that citizens will be unable to avoid punishment based solely upon bias or 
whim.”). 
258.  Id. at 417. 
259.  See id. at 418. 
260.  For a representative list of statutory caps, see supra note 37. 
261.  See, e.g., Lewellen v. Franklin, 441 S.W.3d 136, 144–45 (Mo. 2014) (finding the Missouri 
statutory cap unconstitutional). 
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statutory cap. In such cases, the punitive award will be insufficient: it will 
under-deter potential wrongdoers and be too lenient considering the 
gravity of the wrong. 
The problem might not be as severe as it appears at first glance. In 
many states, the caps are differential: the more reprehensible the conduct, 
the higher the cap. For example, the Florida punitive damages legislation 
normally caps the awards at three times the amount of compensatory 
damages or $500,000 (whichever is greater).262 But a higher cap applies if 
the wrongful conduct was unreasonably dangerous and motivated by 
unreasonable gain, and the defendant was aware of the risk.263 The cap is 
lifted altogether in cases of intentional causation of harm.264 This 
flexibility may suffice to overcome the theoretical hurdle in most cases. 
Admittedly, however, it is far from perfect. 
Adapting the legislative framework to the structure and purposes of the 
proposed model is probably more desirable. There are several ways to 
limit punitive damages in an income-dependent system. Most countries 
that implement day-fines in criminal law impose statutory limits on the 
daily unit,265 and this can also be done in an income-dependent punitive 
damages scheme. However, such limits give up on efficient deterrence and 
proper retribution in the very same cases that inspired the invention of 
wealth-dependent sanctions—those of exceptionally wealthy defendants. 
Relatively high caps on daily units, such as the €30,000 limit on the daily 
unit in the German day-fine system,266 can surely ameliorate the problem, 
but they are still hard to justify. Alternatively, the legislature can limit the 
number of severity units. All systems that employ day-fines in criminal 
law limit the number of days in the calculation.267 As long as these limits 
maintain ordinal proportionality between the gravity of the wrong and the 
severity of the sanction, they seem less problematic than limiting the daily 
unit. They also contribute to predictability. Finally, the legislature can 
remove the caps altogether, allowing unqualified application of the 
proposed model. 
 
 
 
                                                      
262.  FLA STAT. § 768.73(1)(a) (2017) 
263.  Id. § 768.73(1)(b). 
264.  Id. § 768.73(1)(c). 
265.  Kantorowicz-Reznichenko, supra note 193, at 486. Only Finland and Denmark do not 
impose any statutory cap on the daily unit. Id.  
266.  STRAFGESETZBUCH [StGB] [PENAL CODE], § 40, para. 2, translation at 
https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stgb/englisch_stgb.html (Ger.). 
267.  Kantorowicz-Reznichenko, supra note 193, at 486. 
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C. Procedural Tools 
The viability of the proposed model hinges on reasonable access to the 
defendant’s financial information. To ascertain the second variable in the 
formula, the court needs to assess the defendant’s net worth. To calculate 
“total damages,” the court needs to multiply a fraction of the defendant’s 
daily income, broadly defined (the unit value), by the number of severity 
units. Wrong assessment of the financial condition of the defendant would 
lead to under- or overdeterrence. Furthermore, punitive damages will no 
longer represent a proportionate punishment for the specific wrong and 
wrongdoer. Therefore, it is crucial to review whether the current legal 
framework provides procedural instruments to access information about 
the defendant’s financial condition. 
Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs discovery in 
civil cases tried in U.S. district courts.268 According to the general 
principle, parties can obtain discovery regarding non-privileged 
information that is “relevant to any party’s claim or defense and 
proportional to the needs of the case,” considering the burden of discovery 
and its likely benefit.269 Specifically, the rule instructs the claimant to 
make available documents relevant to the computation of damages.270 
However, while the scope of information eligible for discovery is broad, 
courts have some discretion, and may balance the interests of justice 
against the parties’ privacy. Thus, even though income tax returns are 
nonprivileged, courts may limit their discovery.  
For instance, in Wiesenberger v. W. E. Hutton & Co.271 the plaintiff 
brought an action against financial advisers for considerable loss caused 
by their flawed advice.272 The defendants requested disclosure of the 
plaintiff’s income tax returns, to demonstrate that the poor investment 
yielded tax savings that could partly offset the loss. The court denied the 
request, holding that unless “clearly required in the interests of justice,” 
litigants should not be obliged to disclose income tax returns.273 It 
observed that in this particular case, the relevant information could be 
obtained from other sources, such as the plaintiff’s books and bank 
statements, making the income tax returns unnecessary.274 The court added 
                                                      
268.  FED. R. CIV. P. 26.  
269.  Id. § 26(b)(1). 
270.  Id. § 26(a)(1)(A)(iii). 
271.  35 F.R.D. 556 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). 
272.  Id. at 557. 
273.  Id. 
274.  Id. at 558. 
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that if the alternative sources were proven insufficient, the defendant 
would be able to reapply for discovery of the income tax returns.275 Note 
further that while Rule 26 explicitly mentions discovery of documents 
underlying the computation of damages by the claimant, and not by the 
defendant, the general principle of discovery applies to both. 
In the proposed model, the defendant’s financial information in general, 
and income tax returns in particular, are directly relevant to the assessment 
of “total damages.” Without this information, the second variable in the 
formula, the unit value, cannot be calculated. Furthermore, producing 
these documents would not normally be costly or burdensome, because 
they already exist and are in the defendant’s possession. Privacy concerns 
may surely arise, but the importance of the defendant’s financial 
information for the computation of damages, and the ability to minimize 
any infringement of privacy, will probably tip the scale for disclosure. As 
long as the defendant’s wealth can be properly ascertained, the 
practicability obstacle is surmounted. 
State courts have their own rules on discovery in civil cases, and these 
ought to be examined separately. As explained above, many states have 
recognized the relevance of the defendant’s wealth in determining the 
extent of punitive damages.276 This already implies that courts have 
reasonable access to defendants’ financial information. At any rate, 
explicit procedural rules permitting discovery of financial information 
exist in many jurisdictions. For instance, the California Civil Code 
stipulates that the defendant’s financial condition is relevant in the 
assessment of punitive damages, and that the court can order the defendant 
to disclose his financial information.277 It is very common to require 
discovery of the defendant’s financial information, income tax returns in 
particular, only when it becomes necessary, namely after establishing that 
punitive damages are prima facie allowed.278 The rationales for this 
                                                      
275.  Id.  
276.  See supra note 137 and accompanying text.  
277.  CAL. CIV. CODE § 3295 (2017). 
278.  See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.020(e) (2017) (allowing discovery only after “the fact 
finder has determined that an award of punitive damages is allowed . . . .”); FLA. STAT. § 768.72(1) 
(2017) (allowing discovery “after the pleading concerning punitive damages is permitted.”); IOWA 
CODE § 668A.1(3) (2017) (“[A] claim for punitive damages shall not form the basis for discovery of 
the wealth . . . on behalf of the party from whom punitive damages are claimed until such time as the 
claimant has established that sufficient admissible evidence exists to support a prima facie case 
establishing the requirements [for punitive damages].”); Bryan v. Thos. Best & Sons, Inc., 453 A.2d 
107, 108 (Del. Super. Ct. 1982) (“[I]f . . . a factual basis for punitive damages existed, then plaintiff 
would be permitted to discover defendants’ financial condition.”); Hetter v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court 
of State in & for the Cty. of Clark, 874 P.2d 762, 766 (Nev. 1994) (“[B]efore tax returns or financial 
records are discoverable on the issue of punitive damages, the plaintiff must demonstrate some factual 
basis for its punitive damage claim.”); Rupert v. Sellers, 368 N.Y.S.2d 904, 912 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975) 
(“[T]he Court should take a special verdict as to whether . . . plaintiff is entitled to punitive damages. 
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restriction may be protecting defendants from harassment and undue 
pressure from plaintiffs and minimizing infringement of privacy.279 
The proposed model does not seem to pose special practical challenges 
for the courts. Courts in many states are experienced in processing 
requests for disclosure of financial information and in assessing 
defendants’ wealth in the context of punitive damages. However, the 
structure of the proposed model raises a unique procedural question: the 
computation of “total damages,” which requires information about the 
defendant’s financial condition, is necessary not only for determining the 
extent of punitive damages, but also for deciding whether they are 
deserved (if total damages exceed compensatory damages). This problem 
can be resolved. Punitive damages are generally reserved for exceptional 
cases, where the defendant’s culpability, after having paid compensatory 
damages, is so reprehensible as to warrant the imposition of further 
sanctions to achieve retribution or deterrence.280 Courts can make a prima 
facie determination about the desirability of punitive damages in light of 
the reprehensibility of the conduct (which controls the number of severity 
units) and cumulative experience in implementing the proposed model.281 
A positive conclusion will be followed by disclosure of the defendant’s 
financial information, enabling calculation of the unit value and final 
assessment of the desirability and extent of punitive damages. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has set forth an innovative model for incorporating 
defendants’ wealth into the assessment of punitive damages, based on the 
notion of day-fines, commonly used in criminal law systems around the 
                                                                                                                           
Not until plaintiff obtains such a special verdict that he is entitled to punitive damages is it necessary 
or important for him to know defendant’s wealth.”). 
279.  See, e.g., Cobb v. Superior Court of L.A., 160 Cal. Rptr. 561, 565 (Ct. App. 1979) 
(“[Courts need] to balance the right of a defendant to be protected from harassment and to have his 
right to privacy protected against intrusion into his financial affairs against the right to legitimate 
discovery when punitive damages are properly a part of a plaintiff’s case.”); Bryan, 453 A.2d at 108 
(“In cases involving the requested disclosure of a defendant’s financial condition, however, 
consideration must be given to the defendant’s right to privacy and his right to protection from 
harassment . . . .”); Tennant v. Charlton, 377 So.2d 1169–70 (Fla. 1979) (“If plaintiffs were allowed 
unlimited discovery of defendants’ financial resources in cases where there is no actual factual basis 
for an award of punitive damages, the personal and private financial affairs of defendants would be 
unnecessarily exposed and . . . the threat of such exposure might be used . . . to coerce settlements 
from innocent defendants.”); Moran v. Int’l Playtex, Inc., 480 N.Y.S.2d 6, 8 (App. Div. 1984) (“[A] 
defendant should be protected from the harassing effects of net worth discovery as long as the claim 
for punitive damages has not been transformed into a special verdict establishing such liability.”). 
280.  State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 419 (2003); BMW of N. Am., 
Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996). 
281.  See supra note 278 and accompanying text. 
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world. Part I presented the historical development of the law pertaining to 
punitive damages. It started with the preliminary controversy about the 
availability of punitive damages in light of their apparent incompatibility 
with fundamental principles of civil law. Next it discussed the doctrine’s 
expansion in nineteenth-century case law and the reactionary restraint by 
twentieth-century state legislation. Finally, it explained that punitive 
damages are subject to constitutional due process review. 
Part II identified the doctrine’s main rationales. It refuted the argument 
that punitive damages are aimed at compensating non-compensable harm 
and focused on the twin goals of deterrence and retribution. The main 
question with respect to deterrence was why compensatory damages, 
which normally ensure internalization of expected loss by potential 
injurers, were insufficient. Two types of answers seem theoretically sound: 
(1) punitive damages may be used to secure full internalization when 
compensatory damages are insufficient due to under-enforcement 
problems; and (2) punitive damages may be used to eliminate wrongdoers’ 
illicit gains. Neither answer neatly fits the constitutional framework. Thus, 
retribution seems to be the dominant goal. 
Part III considered whether taking into account the defendant’s wealth 
in assessing punitive damages could be consistent with their underlying 
goals. From a deterrence perspective, the wrongdoer’s wealth may be 
relevant when the victim’s loss or the defendant’s gain from wrongdoing 
is unobservable and correlated with the defendant’s wealth. The 
wrongdoer’s wealth may also be relevant in assessing punitive damages if 
they are intended to overcome under-enforcement problems, while 
potential injurers are risk averse and have no insurance coverage for 
punitive damages. From a retributive perspective, the sanction must be 
proportionate to the wrong. According to many theorists, a sanction’s 
severity depends on its effect on the wrongdoer’s well-being. And to 
assess the impact of monetary sanctions on wrongdoers, it is important to 
know how wealthy they are due to the diminishing marginal utility of 
individual wealth. 
Part IV demonstrated how the defendant’s wealth can be integrated into 
the calculation. After explaining the European experience with day-fines, 
it proposed a derivative model for assessing punitive damages. First, the 
court must determine the gravity of the wrong and translate it into 
corresponding severity units. Then the court must assess the unit value—
the wrongdoer’s daily income, broadly defined, or a particular fraction 
thereof. Total damages equal the product of these two variables. If they are 
greater than compensatory damages, the punitive award will be the 
difference between total damages and compensatory damages. If total 
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damages are lower than compensatory damages, punitive damages will be 
nil. 
Part V defended the model from the two relevant theoretical 
perspectives. From a deterrence perspective, income-dependent punitive 
damages are defensible in two types of circumstances, mentioned above. 
First, they may be justified when under-enforcement problems require 
extra-compensatory damages, and liability insurance does not cover such 
damages. Second, they are defensible when the wrongdoer’s illicit gain is 
unobservable and correlates with wealth. From a retributive perspective, 
income-dependent punitive damages may fulfill the requirements of 
cardinal and ordinal proportionality. Accounting for the wrongdoers’ 
wealth is in fact more consistent with retributive justice since the actual 
level of the defendant’s suffering is not ignored. Part V demonstrated that 
from both perspectives, the proposed model provides only a second-best 
solution. Although it does not offer perfect individualization of the 
monetary sanction, it better serves deterrence and retribution than current 
law, and has the important advantages of practicability and predictability. 
Part VI discussed potential hurdles to the implementation of the new 
model. It first analyzed potential constitutional challenges. Particularly, it 
inquired whether the model comports with substantive and procedural due 
process. Part IV then examined whether statutory caps on punitive 
damages might thwart the proposed model and therefore need to be 
modified or repealed. Finally, Part VI reviewed the rules on information 
discovery in civil cases, in order to assess the practicability of an income-
based calculation of damages. 
This Article has not resolved all theoretical and practical problems that 
the proposed model might raise. For example, it does not systematically 
examine whether and subject to which modifications the model may be 
applicable to punitive damages awards against corporations. Because some 
of the main theoretical bases for income-dependent punitive damages 
hinge on defendants’ concave utility functions, it is important to determine 
whether corporations are also risk-averse.282 More importantly, a punitive 
damages award may end up injuring not the firm so much as third parties 
who had nothing to do with the wrong. For example, if the firm absorbs 
the sanction, its profits will drop, and individual stockholders might incur 
a capital loss as well as lower dividends. Adjusting the punitive award to 
the corporation’s wealth or income might have an unwarranted impact on 
                                                      
282.  See, e.g., J. Eric Bickel, Some Determinants of Corporate Risk Aversion, 3 DECISION 
ANALYSIS 233 passim (2006) (discussing “the degree of risk aversion induced by three rationales for 
corporate risk management: the cost of financial distress, costly external finance, and the principal-
agent relationship between shareholders and management”). 
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third parties with totally different utility functions and levels of wealth. 
Still, the Article takes an important step in structuring a feasible and 
theoretically defensible model for assessing punitive damages with 
wrongdoers’ financial condition in mind. 
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